



---

# ***Daily Report***

## ***Supplement***

# **Sub-Saharan Africa**

---

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
Friday  
18 May 1990

# Sub-Saharan Africa SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-APR-90-097-S

## CONTENTS

18 May 1990

**NOTICE TO READERS:** \* indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

### INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

- \* Free Movement of Goods in ECOWAS Noted [London *AFRICAN BUSINESS* Apr] ..... 1
- \* SADCC Celebrates Tenth Anniversary in Apr ..... 2
  - \* Grounds for Optimism [London *WEST AFRICA* 9-15 Apr] ..... 2
  - \* Interview With Makoni [London *WEST AFRICA* 9-15 Apr] ..... 3
- \* Challenges Face SADCC in New Decade [Maputo *TEMPO* 1 Apr] ..... 3

### CENTRAL AFRICA

#### Chad

- \* France's Role During Border Conflict Reported [London *WEST AFRICA* 23-29 Apr] ..... 7

#### Rwanda

- \* President Orders Prosecution of Journalists [London *NEW AFRICAN* Apr] ..... 7

#### Sao Tome & Principe

- \* Isolation Jeopardizing Economic Prospects [London *AFRICAN BUSINESS* Apr] ..... 7

### EAST AFRICA

#### Ethiopia

- \* Eritrean 'Xenophobia' Defeats Peace Talks [London *AFRICA NEWSFILE* 12 Mar] ..... 10
- \* External Support for Opposition Groups  
[Paris *THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER* 31 Mar] ..... 10
- \* Government Said Neglecting Famine Among Oromos [London *NEW AFRICAN* Apr] ..... 11

#### Kenya

- \* France Strengthens Economic Presence  
[Paris *MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS* 16 Mar] ..... 12
- \* Japan's \$189 Million Loan To Fund Projects  
[Paris *THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER* 31 May] ..... 14

#### Somalia

- \* Economic, Political, Military Situation Viewed  
[Paris *THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER* 24, 31 Mar] ..... 14
- \* Chinese May Exchange Arms for Fishing Rights [London *NEW AFRICAN* Apr] ..... 17

#### Tanzania

- President Calls for Japan's Economic Support [Tokyo *MAINICHI SHIMBUN* 11 May] ..... 18
- \* Mwinyi's Drive Against Corruption Questioned [London *NEW AFRICAN* Apr] ..... 18
- \* Foreign Investors Wait for 'Normal Economy' [London *AFRICAN BUSINESS* Apr] ..... 19

## REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

- \* Mandela Discusses International, Domestic Issues [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 7 May] ..... 21
- \* Need for Black Unity Before Negotiations Seen [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 19 Mar] ..... 23

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### Angola

- Presidency, Security Ministry Said in Conflict [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 7 May] ..... 26
- \* Efforts To Negotiate Without Mediator Viewed [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 30 Apr] ..... 26
- \* Savimbi Discusses Peace Process, Support [London AFRICA EVENTS Apr] ..... 29
- \* Reporter Recapitulates War Scenarios [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 16 Apr] ..... 31

### Madagascar

- \* IDA Grants Loan To Develop Private Sector  
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 13 Apr] ..... 34

## WEST AFRICA

### Guinea

- \* CMRN Promotes Conte to Major General  
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 20 Apr] ..... 35
- \* Conakry Sets Priorities for French Aid  
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 23 Mar] ..... 35

### Nigeria

- Security Agents Intensify Coup Plotters Search [NAN] ..... 36
- \* Success of Imposed Two Party System Doubted [London NEW AFRICAN Apr] ..... 36
- \* Shellen Outlines NPA's Future Objectives [London WEST AFRICA 30 Apr-6 May] ..... 37
- \* 'Shuttle Diplomacy' Said To Yield Results [London AFRICAN BUSINESS Apr] ..... 38
- \* Retaliation Against Harassment Abroad Endorsed [London WEST AFRICA 23-29 Apr] ..... 40
- \* Government Policies To Lure Investors Viewed [London AFRICAN BUSINESS Apr] ..... 40

### Senegal

- Extradition Treaty With U.S. Signing Envisaged [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 7 May] ..... 41

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

1

### \* Free Movement of Goods in ECOWAS Noted

34000612A London AFRICAN BUSINESS in English  
Apr 90—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Pini Jason: "Free Movement Begins, but Little by Little"]

[Text] On 1 January 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) protocol on the free movement of goods and services among member-states took effect. The complicated treaty means that any changes will take place slowly.

The agreement to start the Trade Liberalisation Scheme (TLS) was reached in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, during the 1989 Authority of Heads of State summit. The TLS affects 25 products, mainly industrial goods, unprocessed goods and works of art. The duties and taxes on unprocessed goods and works of art, and all non-tariff barriers on such goods originating from the Ecowas subregion, were abolished effective 1 January 1990. Those on industrial goods are to be eliminated gradually.

For implementation purposes, Ecowas member-states are grouped into three zones according to their level of industrialisation, and industrial products are classified into priority and non-priority groups.

For the priority industrial products, countries like Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal are to effect 25 percent yearly reductions to their tariffs. Guinea, Togo, Benin, Liberia and Sierra Leone are to reduce their tariffs at a yearly rate of 16.6 percent, while Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Niger are to reduce their at an annual rate of 12.5 percent.

#### Non-Priority Tariffs

For non-priority industrial projects, each group is to reduce tariffs at the rate of 16.6 percent per annum, 12.5 percent and 10 percent respectively.

The various chambers of commerce in each member-state are advised to issue certificates of origin for products originating from each country.

All barriers are due to be eliminated by 1 January 1994.

Over 90 percent of the subregion's external trade is with Western Europe, particularly the UK, France and Portugal. Intra-regional trade accounts for only 5 percent. Of this 5 percent, only 40 percent is recorded as payments cleared through the West African Clearing House (WACH). The other 60 percent is attributed to smuggling. Even then, the trade recorded through the WACH has declined over the years.

Dr Abbas Bundu, the Executive Secretary of Ecowas, in a recent Workshop on Business in Ecowas held in Lagos, attributed the impediments to the growth of trade in the Ecowas region to these factors:

- differences in ecological systems;
- variances in mineral distribution;
- differences in market patterns;
- smuggling;
- lopsidedness of supplies in the subregion, with acute shortages of goods in some parts while others have a surplus;
- lack of an infrastructural base; and
- a dearth of information within Ecowas.

Event more problematic is the balance-of-payments disequilibrium, owing to the non-convertibility of the currencies of member-states. Even where foreign exchange has been liberalised, as in Nigeria, only one member currency, the CFA [African Financial Community] franc, is quoted in Nigeria's bureaux de change.

The community has nonetheless established some structures to surmount some of the problems, among them the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of West African Manufacturers, Ecobank, the WACH and the Ecowas Fund. Of these, by far the most vital in trade promotion in Ecowas are the WACH, Ecobank and the Ecowas Fund.

WACH, based in Freetown, Sierra Leone, was established in 1975 under the auspices of the West African subregional committee of the Association of African Central Banks, as a multilateral payment arrangement for economic and monetary co-operation in the Ecowas region.

The WACH has these objectives:

- to promote the use of the currencies of the countries of member banks in intraregional commercial and financial transactions;
- to bring about economies in the use of the foreign reserves of member countries; and
- to promote monetary co-operation and consultation among banks.

Under the WACH, the commercial bank which is effecting a customer's payment order in favour of another individual in another member-state delivers the order to the central bank in its own country. The central bank concerned then notifies the WACH and forwards the order to the central bank of the beneficiary's country. On receipt of the notification, the WACH credits the central bank of the beneficiary's country and debits that of the country in which the sender resides. The beneficiary central bank, on receipt of the order, credits its commercial bank, which finally effects payment to the recipient individual in local currency.

#### Transactions Decline

Transactions in the WACH have dropped. They fell from 224.3m West African Units of Account (WAUA1=SDR1) recorded in 1983/84 to WAUA24.9m in 1988/89, a decline of 88.9 percent. The declining fortune is attributed to the late settlement of debts and to a lack of complementarity in the production profiles of

the countries. Nigeria, in particular, has recorded a trade imbalance in the subregion, owing to Nigeria's huge imports from the subregion against its far lower volume of patronage from other members.

Even so, the Ecowas Fund—a financial institution for advancing low-interest loans for projects beneficial to the community as a whole—has approved a \$50m loan to Nigeria for the rehabilitation of Nigerian Machine Tools at Oshogbo, in Oyo state. The fund is also financing ten other projects in Nigeria.

In October 1989, the Nigerian subsidiary of Ecobank was formally opened. The bank is owned 40 percent by Ecobank Transnational Incorporated of Lome, Togo, and 60 percent by Nigerians. Ecobank, the first offshore bank in the region, was established in Togo in April 1979, with the purpose of promoting inter-regional trade.

As a way of improving trade in Ecowas, experts call for the harmonisation of the diverse monetary and credit policies of the many financial sectors in the subregion.

#### \* SADCC Celebrates Tenth Anniversary in Apr

##### \* Grounds for Optimism

34000582 London WEST AFRICA in English  
9-15 Apr 90 pp 579-580—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Tambayi Nyika]

[Text] This month marks the 10th anniversary of the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), a regional economic grouping of nine states established on April 1, 1980, in Lusaka, Zambia with four principal objectives: reducing economic dependence on South Africa, forging economic links to create equitable integration of resources, implementing regional policies and securing international support for its economic programmes.

Ten years on, SADCC continues to pursue these aims despite constraints, some of its own making, others beyond its control. These include unfavorable world prices for its products and commodities, chronic shortages of foreign exchange, high debt servicing rates (total debt estimated at over \$20bn) and South Africa's continued destabilization programme which has cost the entire region over one million lives and up to \$90bn in the past decade. Inappropriate macro-economic policies, manpower shortages and management weaknesses have also accounted for the failure of the economic grouping to reach targets.

Though by 1989 SADCC countries had recorded a progressive 4.5 percent per capita growth rate overall (West Africa 25 Sept - 1 Oct, 1989), a review of the Industry and Trade sector reported a generally poor performance in most countries due to "considerable capacity underutilization in most of the existing manufacturing industries".

"The solution lies in restructuring, to make the regional economy more self-reliant in production," the review recommended. Intra trade, which has not exceeded 5 percent of total regional trade, also remains low due to inflexible exchange rates, tariffs and taxes and inconsistent macro-economic policies.

In view of these constraints, the industry and trade sectors have remained at the center of SADCC's new thrust of promoting enterprises, investment and production because industrialization required to generate employment and economic growth is an "essential prerequisite for economic development".

The SADCC Industrial Development Strategy aims to raise manufacturing's share of regional GDP [gross domestic product] from the current 12 percent to between 15 and 17 percent, to generate at least half a million new manufacturing jobs from the 520,000 recorded in the region in 1985, increase savings and investment ratio to achieve self-sustained growth, increase intra-regional trade from 5-12 percent, reduce import and export dependence on South Africa, rehabilitate viable industrial establishments, and diversify the export base by increasing manufacturing from 10-15 percent of total revenue.

Under the same strategy, exported industrial output would be increased from 10-20 percent of total regional industrial output, and efforts taken to foster labor intensive small scale enterprises and adopt appropriate technology. All these objectives are targeted for the year 2000.

Yet to achieve these formidable goals there is need for the nine governments (Namibia is expected to be the tenth in the near future) to streamline their national industrial and investment policies to foster greater regional co-operation. The review recommended the establishment of a common investment strategy, rationalization of the existing situation whereby member states compete and bid against each other for investment in industrial development, projects and promotion of a spatial distribution of industries in the countries to achieve a more geographically equitable industrialization.

The review also forecast intensified international competition in the 1990s. "For SADCC producers to compete successfully government and the enterprise community must devote more resources to high technology modes of production and specialized training of technical and managerial personnel, and adopt and develop an aggressive marketing culture."

The high dependence on imports continued to undermine the region's industrial base. The review's target is to reduce the import ratio to 35 percent through import substitution and enhanced utilization of domestic and regional in-puts while simultaneously raising the level of exports to 20 percent of total regional export revenues.

A review of manpower in SADCC noted that "shortages of manpower in most skilled categories constitute a major constraint to the implementation of SADCC programmes" But it commended the SADCC governments for devoting large percentages of national budgets to education and training. The Manpower Development Strategy identifies training in management and public administration, agriculture, engineering, technicians and trainers, scientific and mathematical professions as a priority in order to meet manpower requirements and also cut the dependence on expatriates which drains the region of millions of dollars in foreign exchange. An intensified training programme, according to the review, would provide skilled manpower needed by other sectors and strengthen local institutions to serve regional need and facilitate access to existing training opportunities through provision of scholarship. Tourism, which is one of the fastest growing industries in the region, is estimated to generate about \$225m foreign exchange annually with a potential of \$300m a year, mainly from Europe and United States. Due to the fragmented nature of the industry, national tourist bodies have formed themselves into the Southern African Federation of Travel and Tourism (SAFTA). But the review noted that: "International marketing within the region is underdeveloped as it is mostly through a network of tour operators on a national basis and in some cases packaged jointly with that of South Africa, which is undesirable."

#### \* Interview With Makoni

34000582 London WEST AFRICA in English  
9-15 Apr 90 p 580—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Without giving facts and figures Makoni Simba, who became executive secretary in 1984 after the death of Arthur Bolumeris, felt the regional economic grouping had forged an "identity of strong mutual commitment, confidence and political will manifested by governments working together". In terms of objectives of integrating liberated economies and reducing dependence on South Africa (and the world) there is progress. Governments did not believe that it would take 10 years to change a situation created by centuries of colonialism."

The past 10 years, he said, had laid the foundation for integrated programmes in all sectors, and numerous professions and categories had been established to carry out research and implementation of programmes—accountants, farmers, bankers, lawyers, business persons, archaeologists to name but a few.

Progress in transport and communications's food self-sufficiency, agriculture, research on drought resistant seed crops and animal diseases and manpower development demonstrated SADCC [South African Development Coordination Conference]'s successes so far. "The transport system carries more goods for and from member states than from or through South Africa. The Tazara (Zambia/Tanzania), Beira (Zimbabwe/Mozambique), Benguela (Angola/Zambia) and Nacala

(Malawi/Mozambique) rail and road corridors had increased capacity while the Limpopo is soon to be opened."

Air, telecommunication and satellite links now offered direct communication within SADCC instead of routing through Europe or South Africa.

And the private enterprise sector, which wields the most economic clout, had since 1986 become actively involved in investment, productions and financing projects. National Business Councils (NBCs) were last February constituted into a SADCC Business Council.

The former Zimbabwean minister refuted criticism of SADCC governments pursuing national goals that sometimes conflicted with regional objectives and that governments sometimes outbidded each other on projects.

"SADCC is not a replacement or substitute for national economies or trade policies but a supportive instrument towards the pursuit of equitable integration of the economy which should be consistent with national policies. Of course inconsistencies have occurred in the past but the thrust of SADCC is to consolidate economies in the coming decade." But he also admitted that low trade levels were still of major concern due to equally low production levels in the region. "Trade is a function of production and it is low and is not growing and this is worrisome. High levels of production will be the emphasis through the establishment of viable enterprises as set out in the 1989 Industry and Trade Strategy."

On this score Dr Makoni confidently pointed to a "potentially bright future" of continued cooperation and gradual successes. He said Namibian independence, peace moves in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa, recent reduction of military and economic destabilization by South Africa, improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and signs of improved world markets offered opportunities for SADCC to focus on the implementation of numerous projects already researched on.

As SADCC enters its second decade, celebrations are scheduled to continue throughout 1990 in each of the member countries. They kick in off Zambia on April 1 with the ratification of the 1980 Lusaka Memorandum of Agreement.

#### \* Challenges Face SADCC in New Decade

90AF0075A Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese  
1 Apr 90 pp 21-24

[Article by Felisberto Naife; first paragraph is TEMPO introduction]

[Text] Ten years after the founding of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), an organization made up of nine countries in the region, positive results can be noted regarding attainment of the objectives for which it was established in the midst of many obstacles which, for that matter, still

exist. The start of the new decade makes it imperative to formalize the SADCC's existence as an integrated economic group and to adopt a new strategy giving priority to other sectors such as industry and trade. The organization will also be strengthened in the near future by the addition of a new member: Namibia.

On 1 April, the southern African region will celebrate the 10th anniversary of the SADCC. That acronym first appeared at a meeting held in the Tanzanian city of Arusha in July 1979 under the chairmanship of the late president of Botswana, Seretse Khama. The initiative came from the five front-line countries of the time—Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia—and the group was joined the following year by four more countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe), bringing to nine the total number of countries currently constituting the SADCC. That number will soon be increased to 10 by the addition of independent Namibia.

The next step following the conference in Arusha was the holding of a summit meeting by the chiefs of state in Lusaka, the Zambian capital, on 1 April 1980. At that meeting, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe were formally admitted to the organization. Zimbabwe participated in the meeting 18 days before becoming independent.

At that time, the chiefs of state meeting in Lusaka issued a declaration entitled "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation" in which they laid down four main objectives:

- To reduce economic dependence, particularly but not exclusively in relation to South Africa.
- To establish, consolidate, and adopt measures and mechanisms aimed at equitable regional integration.
- To mobilize funds for promoting the implementation of national and regional projects.
- To coordinate actions for obtaining and ensuring international support and cooperation in connection with plans adopted as part of the strategy for economic liberation.

Now that 10 years have passed, we are reaping the fruits of that regional undertaking, an example being the rehabilitation of the Beira Corridor.

Language barriers and differences in administrative traditions may hinder the exchange and circulation of information, but they are not an obstacle within the organization. The SADCC has its headquarters in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, and its executive secretary is Simba Makoni.

The nine countries meet annually for a summit conference, and the organization periodically holds an international conference of donors for the purpose of raising funds and obtaining technical and material support. The donors have varied considerably, including Europe, North America, governmental and nongovernmental

organizations, the United Nations, and the EEC [European Economic Community]. In recent years, it is the Nordic countries that have been prominent in providing funds for several of the organization's projects.

#### Vital Area

During the first decade, transportation and communications occupied a priority position in the organization's plans, with responsibility for that sector going to Mozambique, the country that coordinates the Southern African Transportation and Communications Commission (SATCC). In the 10 years that the SADCC has existed, its member countries have not yet succeeded in eliminating their dependence on South Africa in that sector, although the countries in the hinterland have reduced their dependence significantly.

The countries export about 21 percent of their goods through South African ports. That is the same percentage as in 1981, and it demonstrates the region's continuing dependence on South Africa. Six of the SADCC's nine member countries are landlocked, and 45 percent of their total goods passes through South African ports.

The problem of dependence derives from the fact that most of the member countries share a common border with South Africa, a country that takes advantage of its technological, economic, and military potential to preserve its hegemony in the region. In addition, the critical economic, political, and military situation experienced by the countries in the region over the past two decades has caused their transportation networks to deteriorate owing to sabotage and inadequate maintenance of the infrastructure. Those factors have contributed to a decline in the amount of traffic passing through Mozambican, Tanzanian, and Angolan ports, with the result that those ports are not currently being used to their full capacity.

Of the five existing corridors—Maputo, Beira, Nacala, Dar es Salaam, and Lobito—only three (Beira, Maputo, and Dar es Salaam) are in operation. To mention just one favorable example, traffic through Mozambique's Beira Corridor has improved considerably, rising from 1.45 million metric tons in 1986 to 1.95 million metric tons in 1989. That is an increase of about 34 percent. Work is currently underway to rehabilitate the Nacala and Limpopo Corridors in Mozambique and the Benguela Railroad, which ends at the port of Lobito in Angola. The Benguela Railroad is designed to carry goods to and from Zambia and Zaire, and it is the backbone of transportation for all of central Angola.

The nine countries also cooperate in the field of telecommunications (via satellite), and very recently, the SATCC approved eight projects that include modernization of the communications system in the region. This is of particular importance to Angola, a country that has no rehabilitation projects in the area of telecommunications.

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

5

**Other Sectors**

Although the SADCC's priority has been to rehabilitate and expand infrastructures, especially in the field of transportation, intraregional trade has also received special attention. Trade among the SADCC countries is still negligible, accounting for only five percent of total exports. The intention is to increase that to 12 percent by the year 2000.

There are reasons for this situation. The main reason for the low level of intraregional trade is the underdeveloped economies of the countries in the region, and this is closely linked to the economic structure they inherited from colonialism. Another obstacle of no less importance is the backward state of the transportation network linking most of the countries in the region, a situation referred to above. An important factor making the situation worse is the specter of war in Mozambique and Angola, two countries occupying strategic geographic locations as regards transportation, seeing that they are located on the coast.

The coastal countries could use ocean transportation to establish regular links among themselves, but they have not done so. The road system is quite poor and inadequate, since most of the capitals of the SADCC countries are linked by regular air service, but it obviously costs a great deal to transport most products by that means. In order to facilitate the development of trade, the transportation system must be improved. The SADCC countries still export mainly agricultural products, minerals, and raw materials, while importing fuels, consumer goods, and manufactured goods, their production of which is quite limited, in order to meet the needs of the regional market.

South Africa continues to be the main exporter to some countries in the region, namely Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Over 80 percent of their total imports come from South Africa, and the import firms in those countries have South African owners, placing the other countries at a disadvantage in relation to South Africa.

But despite all that, intraregional trade is growing. The essential point is that these countries are building an intraregional system of trade.

In the energy sector, all the countries—with the exception of Angola, which produces 22.5 million metric tons of petroleum per year—depend exclusively on imports for their crude oil and petroleum products. Prospecting for hydrocarbons in the region is on the increase, however, specifically in Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania.

Petroleum consumption levels in the region are too low—on the order of four million metric tons per year—and this presents a difficulty as far as economic recovery is concerned. Imports of petroleum products result in a sizable expenditure of the sparse foreign exchange available to the organization's member states.

The SADCC region has huge reserves of coal, some of which is of good quality and could be used to meet a large portion of the fuel demand and also as a substitute for petroleum. Coal consumption currently totals about six million metric tons per year, the main consumers being Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, and Swaziland. For its part, the transportation sector—the potential consumer of petroleum products—accounts for 55 percent of the total consumption in those countries, and it is also the sector that plays an important role in shipping petroleum, coal, and charcoal to consumers in other parts of the globe.

Industry is one sector that is now receiving special attention, the reason being that in general, industry in the SADCC's member countries is at a low level of development. Each country in the region has a completely different industrial structure, and so far it has not been possible to establish a strategy suited to realities and objectives. The coming decade will see the establishment of a new industrial strategy involving the start of big projects, something that should not come as a surprise, considering that it is a necessity.

The projects to be started will include an increase in the production of agricultural products, consumer goods, and raw materials needed to fuel the industrialization programs of the nine countries and must also be capable of stimulating trade. The agricultural sector is struggling with the need to make full use of the existing resources, fertile lands, and numerous rivers. It is true that that sector is also struggling with extended droughts and livestock diseases caused by the tse-tse fly.

Another area of cooperation among the SADCC countries is civil aviation, which has grown substantially during the first 10 years of the organization's existence despite continuing difficulties with the routes connecting member countries. The problem is that since commercial carriers are involved, priority obviously goes to the most profitable routes. At present, the member countries are not all linked together, since the airlines do not operate in all of them. The solution is to try to find a way to establish connections among the various airlines serving the region, although that will be a difficult task.

**New Decade**

As it enters its second decade, the SADCC is going to formalize its existence at a regular summit meeting to be held in August—possibly in Namibia—at which the chiefs of state from the member countries are scheduled to sign a legal document giving the regional group formal existence. The organization's entrance into its second decade is also being viewed from the standpoint of development and new challenges such as a strategy for the development of industry and trade and the pursuit of a policy aimed at establishing a food reserve in the region as a means of coping with shortages.

That position is defended by the SADCC's executive secretary, Simba Makoni, who spoke to the media during his visit to Maputo at the end of February. On that

occasion, he said that "our activities have given us more confidence in the effectiveness of regional cooperation. We have rehabilitated the transportation and communications systems, but the critical point continues to be the capacity of our economies."

Simba Makoni also drew attention to the fact that the need for intraregional industry and trade exists because, he said, the SADCC countries still depend on the outside world for the products and services necessary for the operating the railroads. That, he said, is a challenge "compelling us to see to it that our economies constitute

an integrated model." Makoni emphasized: "We must move ahead with our eyes fixed on a single integrated regional economic entity."

The rapid political developments in our region are leading us to reflect on the future of the organization. An independent Namibia and a democratic South Africa can certainly add a new dynamic to the SADCC. Incidentally, the organization's executive secretary himself suggested the possibility that in the not too distant future, South Africa might join the SADCC, seeing that Namibia, which is now independent, is almost a member, the only remaining step being its formal admission.

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## CENTRAL AFRICA

7

## Chad

**\* France's Role During Border Conflict Reported**

34000628A London WEST AFRICA in English  
23-29 Apr 90 pp 687-688—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] The Chadian government has claimed major military successes against rebel forces in eastern Chad. According to a communique issued by the Chadian military on April 4, government forces had pushed the rebels back across the border into Sudan's Darfur province. The French news agency, Agence France Presse (AFP), has confirmed that major clashes took place around Guerda, about 30 miles from the Chad-Sudan border. The government's alleged victory comes in the wake of attacks launched by Chadian rebel forces under the command of Idriss Deby from Darfour province in western Sudan, which were thought to have resulted in the capture of army garrison at Tine and Bahai.

The French government recently stepped up its military aid to Chad. According to the French Ministry of Defence, the decision was taken after consultation with the Chadian authorities and aimed "to guarantee the security of French troops in the region". The 'Epervier' force, which France has maintained in Chad since February 1986, currently consists of 1,000 French troops, stationed at N'djamena and Abeche in the east, seven Mirage F-1 fighter planes, five other aircraft and four Puma helicopters.

The Chadian government has complained to the UN Security Council about Libyan and Sudanese involvement in the fighting on its eastern border. Both governments have denied Chad's accusations.

- Negotiations between Chad and Libya on the ownership of the disputed Aouzou strip have been taking place in the Gabonese capital of Libreville under the auspices of the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. Negotiations have stalled in the past over Chad's alleged holding of Libyan prisoners.
- Official sources in N'djamena announced that a demonstration by around 5,000 students took place on March 30 in support of President Hisssein Habre. Protesters chanted slogans calling for the downfall of Libyan leader, Colonel Mu'ammarr Qadhafi, and Sudanese leader, General al-Bashir.

## Rwanda

**\* President Orders Prosecution of Journalists**

34000599 London NEW AFRICAN in English  
Apr 90 p 17—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Francois Misser]

[Text] President Juvenal Habyarimana has ordered that journalists publishing false information or exciting the people against the government should be prosecuted.

The Justice Minister and Attorney General have asked the directors of the Catholic weekly Kinyamateka and newspaper Kanguka to moderate their stance.

Amnesty International notes that Francois Xavier Hangimana was jailed last January for an article published in Kanguka. He had written a report on the trial of the former minister Vincent Ruhamanya, who was accused of forging documents and embezzling 30 million Rwandan francs (L230,770). Ruhamanya was sentenced to six years imprisonment and fined 100,000 Rwandan francs (L770). Strangely three days after he was sentenced another prisoner, officially described as a madman, stabbed Ruhamanya and almost killed him.

The Rwandan State security boss Augustin Nduwayezu is now threatening other journalists for writing subversive articles. Journalists like Anastase Seruvumba of Iwacu, father Andre Sibomana and Felicien Semusambi, of Kinyamateka, have been detained or put under house arrest.

The President feels particularly bitter about the paper Kinyamateka because he did not like the way it wrote up the 30 years of independence, where there were complaints about education and living standards of the peasants.

Rwandan journalists are very worried about the future, especially as one journalist Sylvio Sindambiwe met his death in a mysterious car accident. He was also an independent, uncompromising journalist who had been threatened by the security forces.

## Sao Tome &amp; Principe

**\* Isolation Jeopardizing Economic Prospects**

34000604 London AFRICAN BUSINESS in English  
Apr 90 pp 10-13—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By John Ladhams]

[Text] The tiny island nation of Sao Tome and Principe is facing a situation where important decisions on economic policy will have to be taken with the utmost urgency.

From having been Portugal's smallest colony and at the same time one of its economic mainstays thanks to profitable cocoa production earlier this century, the island state achieved independence in 1975 and had to face the prospects of going it alone, with a population of less than 100,000 and a land area of only 965 sq km.

Now, more than 15 years later, the transition from a colonial economy of cocoa plantations run from Europe to an independent economy of reasonable self-sufficiency is fast grinding to a halt.

Sao Tome e Principe is one of the only three island nations that do not belong either to the Commonwealth or too a regional grouping such as the Pacific Forum [the

## CENTRAL AFRICA

other two are both African nations: Cape Verde and the Comoros]. The sense of isolation has become an economic reality.

Cocoa was introduced from Brazil in the early 19th century and rapidly became virtually the only crop cultivated on both islands. Plantations were established throughout the 19th century by the Portuguese, worked by labourers imported from Angola and elsewhere on the African continent.

When production was at its peak in the first decade of this century, at over 30,000 tonnes per annum, the islands were the third biggest producer of cocoa in the world. Then the major chocolate manufacturers in the UK and West Germany, especially Cadbury's, learned of the forced labour conditions of virtual slavery and withdrew from Sao Tome e Principe, which led to a sharp decline in production.

However, a gradual recovery did occur, especially during the Second World War, when output reached 12,000t in 1944. By the time of independence, annual production averaged 9,000t.

Both islands are divided into plantations (rocas). The rocas cover virtually the whole area, except for the town of Sao Tome, the capital, and the small town of Santo Antonio, on Principe.

#### Nationalisation

In 1975, following the flight of the Portuguese plantation owners and technicians at independence, the plantations were nationalised and to some extent were regrouped, leaving 13 on Sao Tome and two on Principe.

Production was slow to recover, owing to an almost total lack of management and technical skills. From an output of 4,000t in 1976, a slight recovery brought production up to 7,000t by 1979, but the 1989 figure is estimated at little more than 5,000t.

The export value of the crop has declined from \$10m in 1984 to about \$6m in 1988.

In an attempt to improve the situation, a policy of privatisation was adopted in 1985, following World Bank pressure. To date, five plantations on Sao Tome have been given over to private foreign management; three—Bela Vista, Agua Ize and Monte Cafe—are managed by Portuguese, and two—Ubabudo and Santa Margarida—are run by French. But ownership as such remains with the Sao Tome e Principe government.

Of the remaining state-run plantations, Agostinho Neto is the largest, with an impressive production capacity—it is suffering from a lack of investment.

A typical plantation has a headquarters (sede), where the management and processing are situated, and on average five "dependencies" (dependencias). The dependencies were formerly separate plantations, but now they send harvested cocoa to the headquarters.

Efficiency varies enormously: some dependencies have been totally abandoned, and yet others are the mainstay of their respective plantations.

Some attempts have been made to create government-controlled workers' co-operatives, but without much success. Monte Estoril, formerly a dependencia of Milagrosa, is now managed by a committee from the trade-union organisation, and Filipina, not far from the capital, is run by the ruling party, the Movimento de Libertacao de Sao Tome e Principe (MLSTP).

#### Extremely High Quality

The quality of the cocoa is extremely high, and the bulk of the production is used for flavourings, since it has a fairly acid quality. All cocoa exports go through Ecomex, the government export agency. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Netherlands buy most of the country's cocoa.

- The price received for exports does not reflect the high quality in relation to the world market price. The majority of exports go to the GDR at well below world market price, under an aid-exchange agreement, and while there is a desire for market diversification, the authorities have no appropriate skills or contacts to achieve it.
- Production has fallen since independence, partly through a lack of foreign exchange required for renovating processing equipment, for providing adequate transport or for acquiring pesticides, fertilisers etc., and partly through a lack of management skills. In the present circumstances, improvement can come about only by a combination of political decisions and appropriate development aid agreements.
- Privatisation has not resolved the fundamental dilemma of how to adapt the plantation system, albeit with a basically sound infrastructure, to the requirements of modern production; this need clearly calls for a political decision, but under the present circumstances, the choice is very difficult.

While cocoa accounts for over 90 percent of the country's exports, other cash crops are produced, but on a very small scale. Coffee in sufficient quantities for domestic consumption is produced on Monte Cafe roca. Near the coast, some copra processing takes place.

Food-crop production is another major problem facing the country. Until independence, the growing of food crops was prohibited, and all foodstuffs were imported from Portugal.

From 1975 onwards, some attempts have been made to make this very fertile country self-sufficient in food crops, but it is a very slow process, despite a successful French aid project near the capital.

Fishing, while not prohibited under Portuguese rule, was not developed and is still wholly artisanal. An EEC fishing agreement, covering all the Gulf of Guinea states, is still at the planning stage.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FBIS-AFR-90-097-S**  
**18 May 1990**

**CENTRAL AFRICA**

**9**

The prospects, then, are bleak for this tiny island nation. The World Bank has a cocoa-rehabilitation project on two plantations under foreign management—Bela Vista and Ubabudo. Together with the IMF, the Bank is insisting that privatisation is the only answer. But in the long term, this could mean merely selling out to foreign interests, if indeed any prospective takers come forward.

Co-operativisation could be a solution, but only for the smaller plantations and dependencias.

Tourism is always a possibility for these islands, which have truly unspoilt beaches, exotic landscape and fascinating endemic wildlife. But the government is naturally hesitant, lest the islands go the way of the Caribbean, with mass tourism bringing social and cultural devastation. In any case, the tourist infrastructure is very limited, with only one major hotel, poor communications and shortages of basic commodities.

Important political decisions will have to be made, and soon, but a way out of economic isolation is not easy to determine.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**Ethiopia****\* Eritrean 'Xenophobia' Defeats Peace Talks**

34000600A London AFRICA NEWSFILE in English  
12 Mar 90 pp 2, 3—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Excerpt] By recent statements and actions, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front [EPLF] is seemingly pushing ahead with plans to create an independent Eritrean state, underscored by the formidable February military successes over the Ethiopian army. The early February fighting erupted all along a front extending from the city of Keren eastwards to the to the port of Massawa. EPLF forces engaged eight Ethiopian brigades and destroyed or captured a large number of tanks.

Massawa fell to a joint seaborne and land operation by the guerrillas. The Ethiopian government did not admit the loss of their major port and ordered a counter-attack. It transpired that much of the large quantity of military equipment seized in Massawa had been turned to immediate use by the time the Ethiopian forces counter-attacked. Nine warships were sunk and a landing craft was captured.

EPLF forces quickly established themselves on the escarpment road to Asmara as far as Ghinda. Keren is reported to be seriously short of food; appeals are being made for the Ethiopians trapped there to surrender. A large ammunition and supply depot near Addi Kaieh has been destroyed and the garrison settlement of Mandifora surrounded. Even the Eritrean capital, Asmara, seems gravely threatened, for the Ethiopian government is desperately flying in troops for its defence. The situation in the city is described as tense with electricity cuts and shortages of fuel and food. The military has introduced its own rationing and the Ethiopian Airforce has commenced bombing Massawa.

Meanwhile, some Eritrean leaders are considering what response a unilateral declaration of independence would evoke whereas others argue merely for a ceasefire at this stage and an exchange of prisoners since they believe that the Ethiopian government may well soon collapse. The Ethiopian economy is very severely strained by the demands of several internal wars and the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front and the EPDM [Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement] forces threaten communications between Addis Ababa and the port of Assab. Army morale is low. But the Ethiopian leader Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, is a calculating and resourceful and he may not be finished yet.

What has caused this breakdown in the peace process so courageously initiated by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter? (See Africa Newsfile No 51). One very significant factor is that despite the current euphoria over glasnost and perestroika in Europe, substantive military supplies for Third World countries -Ethiopia included - are still arriving from the Soviet Union. The most recent shipment arrived in mid-January and there was also a large one in December. Also, Eritrean leaders have long felt

exasperated over the West's insistence on addressing only symptoms -like famine and refugees- and not root causes of north-east Africa's political maladies. Both the Eritrean and the Tigrayan movements say they are struggling for their people's welfare, and, they insist, enjoy their confidence.

After conflicts with American Green Berets, then Russian advisers and always Israelis; ignored by the UN and the OAU, Eritrean leaders say they have developed 'self-reliance,' itself a virtue, to the point almost of political xenophobia. There is today a renewed feeling in the province that in the short-run recently renewed Israeli military intelligence and propaganda assistance to the beleaguered Ethiopian regime is weakening what Western, and particularly American and British, resolve there was to seek a just resolution of the problems that lied behind Africa's longest war. In the long run the leaders of both Eritrea and Tigray, few of whom have strong views on the Israelis, nevertheless feel that the latter are making a rare political blunder by identifying so closely with the regime in Addis Ababa.

Strategically located, today's Ethiopia is a product not only of courageous resistance to the scrambling powers of Europe as they endeavoured to seize all Africa towards the end of the last century, but also of Ethiopia's own parallel expansion from its Abyssinian highland core to incorporate vast areas and peoples which in many cases, it had never previously ruled. Modern Ethiopia is as much new as old. Nevertheless, greater Ethiopian nationalism remains a vital factor, and its Shewan Amhara supporters, whether in the Derg or lobbying in the Washington diaspora, remain as emotionally attached to it as were the upholders of imperial 'traditions' overthrown by Colonel Mengistu. [passage omitted]

The leaders of both the TPLF [Tigre People's Liberation Front] and the EPLF (and the OLF [Oromo Liberation Front] for that matter) all eschew publicly, and the structure of their movements is deliberately designed, to prevent the cult of personality. Prominent among the Tigrayan leaders are Sebehat Le-ab and Meles Zenawi. They seek a restructuring and decentralization of the government not only in Tigray, but throughout Ethiopia.

The command structure of the TPLF, as in many guerrilla movements, is based on Marxist-Leninist principles, but that is not to say that the political thinking of the leadership is not nationalistic. [passage omitted]

**\* External Support for Opposition Groups**

34000624A Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER in English 31 Mar 90 p 4—FOR  
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article: "Ethiopia: Opponents' External Support"]

[Text] Since President Mengistu's speech of March 5 (ION No 421), there has been frenetic activity among the clandestine movements to whom he outstretched his

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## EAST AFRICA

11

hand. In fact, since the evening of March 6, the central committee of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (which has subsequently become the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party), has revised a certain number of issues including the idea of a multi-party system, which it has ruled out, a no less open symbolic breach in the absolute monopoly of power.

Opponents of the Ethiopian regime, who are trying to organise themselves in case they can one day enjoy a legal status, are often quite substantially backed by foreign entities, especially among conservative movements. The Ethiopian People's Democratic Alliance (EPDA) has for a long time been receiving aid from the United States, while the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU, monarchist), receives support from conservative Arab countries and certain right-wing fundamentalist North American Protestant circles which aim to forge an alliance with dissidents exiled from the Marxist regime like the former director of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), Dawit Wolde Giorgis.

As for the former left-wing parties (EPRP, MEISON), they have been seeking, until now without success, support from European Socialist parties. Meanwhile, in order to keep open an option to take armed action, several Arab countries have stepped up their support on the northern fronts. Saudi Arabia is supporting the EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front] and Iraq, the TPLF [Tigre People's Liberation Front]. Both use Somalia and Sudan as intermediaries to transit arms. The TPLF, in particular when it recently conquered Debre Tabor, used munitions provided by Iraq. The Islamist military in Khartoum, who transited the supplies have no sympathy for the pro-Albanian TPLF, but obeyed instructions from Bagdad.

This is not news in Ethiopia, even to the opponents of the regime while Colonel Mengistu makes full use of the situation by playing on the anti-Muslim sentiments of the Abyssinians.

#### \* Government Said Neglecting Famine Among Oromos

34000600B London NEW AFRICAN in English  
Apr 90 pp 42—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] When the Ethiopian government appealed to the donor community for food aid to feed a starving population which it estimated at 1.7 million, it named Wollo, Gonder, Tigre and Eritrea as the affected areas. However, recent visitors to the provinces of Arsi, Bale, Haraghe and Kaffa, where the population is predominantly Oromo, report that famine is now beginning to affect these areas too. The worrying thing about this information is firstly, that these are not traditional famine areas—they had enjoyed heavy rains and are endowed with fertile soil; and secondly, that their plight has not been brought to the attention of the world.

On 12 December 1989, the American government announced food donations totalling 160,000 tons for the next three months in answer to Ethiopia's appeal.

However, no mention has been made of famine within the Oromo areas where fighting has continued since the new year.

#### Success in Asosa

The Oromo liberation army has enjoyed dramatic successes in Asosa province. It has won significant victories in Asosa, Begi, Bambasi and at the Shirquooole bridge, all in the extreme west of the country along the Sudanese border.

The local people have risen up and chased the occupying Ethiopian forces from the area. A team of four Cuban medical personnel were captured in Asosa town. Havana has confirmed their arrest and asked for their release.

But this has resulted in the government starving the Oromo of food aid, though drought is threatening the whole areas between Asosa and Gambella.

Of the estimated 25 million Oromos about 95 percent live in rural areas practicing agriculture. They constitute more than 50 percent of the Ethiopian population more than those of the ruling Amhara. They inhabit an estimated 600,000 square kilometers in the south, south-east and south-west of the country as well as some highland areas.

When President Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power in 1974, the Dergue initially won the support of the Oromo peasants, by instituting land reform. It returned the land taken from them three generations previously.

But in 1984, the Dergue introduced harsh policies of resettlement and villagisation. Mass deportations of people from famine-affected areas in the north (mainly Tigre and Wollo) to the more "fertile" Oromo lands in the south. Large numbers of refugees were relocated to the forests and grazing lands of the Oromo.

#### Oromo Refugees

Large forest areas were cleared in the south-west, changing demography and affecting the environment adversely. Oromo productivity was disrupted, as farmers were evicted from their land, or forced to pay extra taxes, perform services for the new resettlement camps, drafted into war activities, and persecuted as suspected opposition.

Many thousands of Oromos themselves became refugees, fleeing from West Ethiopia into Sudan, and from East Ethiopia, into Djibouti and Somalia. They are, ethnically, Africa's largest refugee population.

As a result, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), formed in the 1970s to fight the Dergue, on a platform of secession, mushroomed in the 1980s. The OLF now

controls parts of south-west Ethiopia in Wollega province, around Asosa and Gambella and Gimbi and in Eastern Ethiopia, in the provinces of Haraghe (around Gursum, Gaara, Habro, Mulataa, and Oborra), Bale (around Wabe and Elkere) and Arsi (around Arba Guguu).

But in South-west Ethiopia, the OLF are caught in a pincer between the Ethiopian troops and the SPLA, who have several bases around Asosa, inside Ethiopia.

In mid-December 1989, hundreds of Oromo children started arriving in an Oromo refugee camp in Damazine, Central Sudan in a severe state of malnutrition and shock. They were the orphaned children who, among 6,000 Oromo refugees, had fled from the South Sudanese town of Yabus, when the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) took it in early November 1989.

When the Ethiopian army started a pincer movement attack with the SPLA in early December, the children began a 300 km walk back to safety as refugees in Damazine. A British teacher Mandy Heslop and a nurse Rachel Pounds, from the London-based agency, "Health Unlimited", made a 530 km trip, under the protection of the OLF, to return to safety in Sudan. "We were tracked the whole journey by the Dergue and the SPLA," Rachel told New African. "The countryside in that area is fertile and rich, but the war prevents the people from feeding themselves."

The Oromo Relief Association (ORA), formed in 1979 to provide humanitarian assistance to Oromos in the OLF-held areas, and among Oromo refugees outside Ethiopia, is concerned about the plight of its people. Kulani Gudina, Deputy Chairwoman of OKA commented in Khartoum, "Two of our trucks were blown up in December, by landmines on the road between Damazine and Kurmuk, in Sudan, and five of our staff killed. In the attack on Yabus, we lost all our relief supplies, including 200 tons of food, as well as medicines and hospital equipment. We need to get food to our people from the Sudanese side, or we are fearful that they will starve."

### Digging Up Roots

Mandy confirmed this: "The people [who fled from Yabus] were digging up roots to eat, as there is not enough food."

ORA reports that it fed a total number 32,000 people in 1988/89, but that the numbers fleeing villagisation and war is increasing. Without further food commitments, disaster will result.

If the Oromo are starving, here is a classic example of man-made famine, and the political manipulation of the crisis. If international donors choose to turn a blind eye also to the plight of the Oromos, they are colluding in the prolonging of the conflict, for while the Oromos are ignored, despite being the majority, their will to fight for their ground will be strengthened, not weakened.

## Kenya

### \* France Strengthens Economic Presence

90AF0042A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 90 pp 733-734  
—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by A. Lagarde: "France Has Become One of Kenya's Foremost Economic Partners"]

[Text] A study by the MONITEUR DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (International Trade Monitor) published in 1989 ranked Kenya among the four sub-Saharan and Indian Ocean countries likely to attract French investors, somewhat tempted to retreat to continents other than Africa. The French minister of finance, moreover, urged those same investors to explore the markets of English-speaking Africa.

Since the mid-seventies the French presence in Kenya, which was not based on any historical tradition, has grown to the point that France has become one of Kenya's principal foremost partners.

### Franco-Kenyan Financial Cooperation

A country outside the French sphere, Kenya is eligible for financial protocols set up by the French treasury. It also benefits from the cultural and technical cooperative programs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first Franco-Kenyan financial protocol was signed in 1976. It involved a sum of 150 million French francs earmarked to fund radiobroadcasting, meteorology, and flight equipment.

Other protocols were signed (in millions of francs): in 1981: 234; 1982: 285; 1983: 185; 1985: 415; 1986: 700; 1987: 228; 1988: 71.5; and 1989: 200. [Money from] the 1986 protocol was reserved exclusively for the construction of the Turkwell hydro-electric dam.

During the visit of the minister of finance, an additional protocol for 130 million francs was signed. This financial aid will be focused on civil aviation, meteorology, water supplies, and telecommunications.

In addition, Kenya has benefited from the debt-reduction measures for African countries decided on at the Dakar summit of French-speakers, and which affect 1.3 billion francs in government aid loans for development. These measures have fortunately offset the fact that French aid to Kenya currently involves the lowest level of grants, on the order of 40 percent. On average, 60 percent of aid to other foreign countries is donated.

According to Kenya's estimate, French aid for 1989-90 ranked fourth, after the World Bank, Japan, and the EEC, and ahead of Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. The funding granted for the Turkwell dam, however, was clearly the determining factor in that ranking. On the other hand, the recent increase in Japanese commitments to Kenya (250 million dollars in

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## EAST AFRICA

13

1989) will widen the gap between that country, which has become Kenya's number-one bilateral creditor, and other moneylenders.

The issue of adapting aid to Kenya's needs is also worth raising. Indeed, Kenya increasingly needs aid not tied to projects but rather balance-of-payments aid, for instance, or aid to restructure economic sectors, as part of structural adjustment. As it stands, French aid is essentially project-aid.

However that may be, on balance, French financial cooperation is seen as more positive than not.

#### Trade Exchanges and Investments

In 1988, France was Kenya's fifth-largest supplier (100 M\$), after the United Kingdom (320 M\$), Japan (210 M\$), the United Arab Emirates (200 M\$), and FRG (160M\$). It was only its eighth-largest customer (17 M\$), after the United Kingdom, the FRG, Uganda, the Netherlands, the United States, Tanzania, and Italy.

The bulk of imports consists of agrofood products and flowers. France is the number-one importer of Kenyan green beans ("French beans"), which enjoy entirely unrestricted access to the French market. Exports are essentially industrial products.

The growth of Franco-Kenyan trade has gone hand in hand with that of French investment in Kenya. There are about 30 French companies in the country: Total, Air France, Indosuez, Bureau Veritas, Thomson, Spie Batignolles, SOGREA [Grenoble Hydraulics Research and Applications Company], SOGEA [expansion unknown], SOFREAVIA [expansion unknown], etc. The French investment stock is estimated at 400 million francs, ranking third behind the United Kingdom and the FRG. These investments were boosted recently through buy-backs of companies with subsidiaries in Kenya (cement factories with Lafarge, metal packaging with Carnoud, medications with Rhone-Poulenc).

The growth of French investment is all the more remarkable in that, with the exception of the United Kingdom for historical reasons, Kenya is hardly attracting any foreign investors. The Japanese and Americans are liquidating their investments, despite the pleas of Kenyan authorities.

Investors are not the only Frenchmen attracted to Kenya. Thirty thousand French tourists visited the country in 1988, a slight increase over 1987.

#### Development of Political Relations

France's interest in African countries outside its sphere, unlike its interest in former colonies, was not really governed by any sort of grand design. French settlement in those countries was most often linked, in the beginning, to economic and trade interests that were not necessarily followed by any show of political curiosity. Certainly there are exceptions to this rule: Ethiopia in

East Africa, for example, where France has long maintained a presence that is today primarily cultural (the French-Ethiopian lycee in Addis Abeba) and with whom political relations, until 1974, were regular.

In Kenya's case, although the beginnings of cultural cooperation coincided with independence in 1963, the sums involved are still modest (about 20 million French francs in 1989). Visits to Kenya of French VIPs were restricted to technical matters until the prime minister's visit in 1989 and that of the state minister of the economy, finances, and budget in 1990. France's relative discretion in this area, while its trade, investments, and assistance to Kenya were growing, stood out more clearly for a double reason: the other Western countries (Great Britain naturally, but also the FRG, Italy, and the northern countries) kept up sustained political relations with Kenya. On the other hand, President Moi chose Paris as the site of his first visit abroad shortly after coming to power in 1978. He subsequently traveled there several times, his last visit taking place in 1989.

There are several reasons for Kenya's interest in France. In a country where political orientations are a presidential prerogative, President Moi's affection for France is a determining factor, even if the remainder of the political and administrative structure is less interested by a country outside the Anglo-Saxon sphere, whose impress on Kenya is still decisive.

The relative success of France's African policy, that is, actually, its policy in French-speaking Africa, has undoubtedly captivated the Kenyan head of state. In contrast, the type of relations Great Britain maintains with its former colony do not measure up, at least on the level of interstate relations. Indeed, although Kenyan society is still deeply permeated by the British model, the United Kingdom is not the only country with whom it deals.

Although located in the heart of an English-speaking area, Kenya's once-removed economic neighbors are French-speaking (Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Zaire). The interest in French can thus be understood not only in terms of purely cultural considerations, but also in terms of economic interests, and beyond that, political ones.

Despite their initial partiality, Kenyans had to wait several years before France reciprocated with a comparable, or at least parallel, interest. The two visits mentioned earlier certainly contributed to closing the gap, which could only be completely so by a visit to Kenya from the French head of state.

As for Kenyans' attitude to anything bearing the French label: In Nairboi the French Cultural Center is a hub of activity mentioned without fail by tourist guidebooks. Peugeot (three of whose models are assembled in Kenya) has held its own against the Japanese competition in the streets of the capital and elsewhere, and Air France has five weekly flights from Paris to Nairobi. France is not unknown to Kenyans, although its presence in the country is far from balancing that of the Anglo-Saxons.

France's success in Kenya illustrates the possibilities that exist in African countries outside its sphere at a time when "Afro-pessimism," to use the expression of a former minister of cooperation, is escalating alarmingly for anyone interested both in the future of the continent and the French presence in that part of the world.

Apart from Kenya, East Africa does not, it is true, offer the same possibilities. Yet several recent French initiatives are worth noting: the signing of a financial protocol with Uganda (the first in many years) and forgiveness of a portion of the Tanzanian debt. Conversely, in the Horn of Africa, where the situation of different states in which long-running disputes (Djibouti-Ethiopian railway) [words missing in original] does not admit of similar prospects. Problems are also serious further south: civil war in Mozambique, a rocky economic situation in Zambia. These different factors only make the French presence in Kenya more notable.

#### \* Japan's \$189 Million Loan To Fund Projects

34000639A Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER in English 31 Mar 90 p 7—FOR  
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Following an agreement signed on March 30 in Nairobi, Japan is to lend Kenya a series of credits worth a total 4,347 million shillings (189 million dollars) to help finance four projects. One is the modernisation of the airport of Mombasa (58.21 million dollars), the second is for road construction in the Tana River Basin (42 million dollars), third, for the development of irrigation in the Tana Delta (39 million dollars) and lastly for the modernisation of a cement plant (49 million dollars). These credits have been approved with a 2.5 percent interest rate, to be repaid over twenty years with a ten year grace period.

Kenya is, with South Africa, a target country for Japanese economic interest. Japan is fast becoming a competitor to Kenya's traditional donor countries—North America and Europe. Already in agricultural fertilizers, a sector where bilateral donations cover 50 percent of Kenya's requirements, Tokyo recently agreed to loan Nairobi 135 million shillings (5.8 million dollars), for the purchase of Japanese fertilizer.

### Somalia

#### \* Economic, Political, Military Situation Viewed

34000625A Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER in English 24, 31 Mar 90—FOR  
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article: "Somalia: Political & Military Outlook (part 1 of 2)"]

[24 Mar 90 p 8]

[Text] A month after the new government took up its functions in Mogadishu (ION No 319) and as the repeatedly postponed SNM Congress is finally about to take place, THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER, this week publishes the first of a two-part special survey based on local witness reports, observations and interviews. The first part of our survey covers Somalia's military problems, in both the north and the south, and seeks to define the existing relationships between the various clans. The second part will cover economic questions and the international dimension of the conflict, with special reference to the ways in which it affects Somalia's neighbour Djibouti.

#### The Military Situation in the North

The situation has been stable since May 1989. The Somalia National Movement [SNM] is holding the whole of the western region, including the frontier post of Loyada, the port of Zeila and the towns of Garissa and Gargara. Borama is still in government hands and the Gadabursi militia encircled in the town launches regular counter-attacks to try to break through the siege. In the central region, Burao, Hargeisa and Berbera are still government-controlled but also besieged. The defending forces are well-armed and protected with supplies of heavy artillery and ringed by mine-fields, but they are lacking in number as many men have deserted, particularly those belonging to the Hawiye clan. They are also short on food supplies as their food comes from Mogadishu by boat. In the east, the situation is more volatile. The SNMs seem to have again taken control of Erigavo after having succeeded in negotiating with the Dolbahante and the Warsangeli, but Galcaio is still in the government's hands.

The SNM is well-equipped with light weapons and receives a constant supply from Ethiopia. The rebel organisation has captured a large number of vehicles from the government forces which it has subsequently equipped with semi-heavy artillery such as 7mm Soviet-Egyptian machine guns, 105mm American recoilless weapons, Soviet BM-21 rocket-launchers, dismantled and re-assembled tube by tube on Toyota Land Cruisers etc. But it is seriously in need of artillery, demining equipment and food. The nucleus of the SNM is composed of five regiments, each with about a thousand men and with a clan organisation structure. Only the "Huffo" unit, a "trans-clan" experiment has merely 250 men. Each regiment may, if necessary, "enlist" nomadic members of its clan. Each man is armed and carries 20-30 cartridges, but cannot operate for more than a few days after which, the fighters are obliged to return to the bush to seek food.

Hence the stale-mate situation. The government is unable to counter-attack. The regular Army in the towns, is hemmed in, and its troops have to travel "en masse" along the Berbera Hargeisa road which is constantly mined and under guerilla attacks. The government

forces are absolutely forced to take a defensive position. It has run out of aircraft (there may be two or three Shenyang F-9s in Berbera, no doubt not in any fit condition to fly, and whatever is left of the fearsome Hawker Hunters belonging to the Rhodesian mercenaries, are in Mogadishu), and of armoured troops (in May 1988 the 26th Division possessed 90 tanks, but today there are only about ten which are still in working condition). The government is playing a waiting game banking on conflicts developing between its various adversaries to help it win.

#### The Situation in Central Somalia and in the South

Just as the SNM attacks on Burao and Hargeisa in May 1988 gave impetus to the more important military operations in the north, the popular uprising in Mogadishu in July 1989 marked the beginning of the revolt in the south. The following month, Galcaio, Hiran and Belet Uene rebelled and very violent repression ensued. From its bases in Ethiopia, the SNM counter-attacked, in a region situated between Galcaio and Hiran. It set up a Coordination Committee for the southern front, headed by the former governor of Hargeisa and one-time member of the Central Committee of the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party, Omar Salad Elmi, who became a dissident in 1982 along with a former Army colonel, Abdallahi Warsame Deeble "Hulduleh". After having briefly occupied the headquarters of the 4th Division in Galcaio in November 1989, the guerilla forces had to retreat into the bush, and in the last three months, about 80,000 refugees have fled to Ethiopian Ogaden where they are still deprived of any international aid.

South of Wabi Shebelle, the situation is extremely complicated. The Hawiye clans have become quasi-dissident, but content themselves with civil disobedience and clandestine propaganda. Their soldiers are deserting on the northern front. The south Ogadeni clans, composed of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) undertook intensive military operations which forced President Siad Barre and General Samanter to leave the capital last December, and to spend the entire month in the Beidabo base so as to direct the taking in hand of the 60th Division (fighting on the south front, and which was starting to lose heart), personally.

Meanwhile, the Rahanweyn clans which have also sided with the rebels, formed the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM). The border with Kenya is the stake in continuing combats with neither side ever really in control of the area. The government hardly has any control, apart from the Benadir coast between Kisimayo and Mogadishu where the 77th Division, led by the President's son, Meslah Barre, and entirely composed of Marehans, constitutes the regime's last post. But the absence of any real coordination between the different movements is, for the time being, President Barre's most outstanding advantage.

#### Clans and Politics

The current disintegration of Somalia constitutes the failure of Siad Barre's politics which sought to swing the balance in favour of the Darod in general and within the Darod, towards the Ogadeni-Marehan. After ten years of anti-Issa policy (secondary to the repression of the Majertins), the regime has managed to alienate, in less than two years, the Issas, most of the Hawiye, as well as some Ogadenis and Rahanweyn. Its last remaining support comes from the Marehan, a section of the Ogadenis, members of the "Sab" (outcast social groups not belonging to a clan, and to which Prime Minister Samanter belongs), and the Gadabursis. In the north, the Dolbahante are hesitant and are negotiating with the SNM. This anti-government explosion does not imply that its adversaries are united. In the south the clans are fighting on an "each-clan-for-itself" basis while in the north, they negotiate individually with the SNM.

Within the SNM itself, the balance between the various Issaq clans is fragile. Its forthcoming Congress was postponed to ensure that there was enough time for prior consultation between the traditional chiefs. Muhammad Silyano's, external leadership is highly contested and he may even be forced to step down. However, the movement's number two, Hassan Issa Jama, popular among the fighters in Somalia, is an Ida Galley while Silyano is a Habr Jaclo, which has given rise to an inter-clan diplomacy problem. The dream of a "Great Somalia" having evaporated, a political balance must be found in a country where an ultra-democratic clan culture is the other side of the coin of a total absence of a state tradition, or even aversion to the concept of the state. The SNM's political project seems to be directed towards a federal democratic parliament where the federal provinces will enjoy wide administrative autonomy and where the State would reflect the demographic importance of each clan. Despite the government's wariness as regards a too great a concentration of power, SNM "policy" has ruled out any possibility of secession, even if it is a popular idea among the Issaqs.

[31 Mar 90 p 8]

[Article: "Somalia: Economic and Diplomatic Outlook (part 2 of 2)"]

[Text] Following the first part of our special report on Somalia published in last week's edition of THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER, below is the second and final part, which deals with the economic and diplomatic situation in Somalia today.

#### Somalia's Economic Problem

The economic situation in this country can only be described as disastrous. North Somalia, which used to account for 80 percent of Somalia's foreign currency revenues through sales of livestock to the Arab countries, now contributes hardly anything to the national economy. Supporters of the regime are still trading but on a small-scale, through the Port of Berbera. The SNM

has created a small amount of activity via the port of Hiis Mehed which it controls and where Indian and Yemenite trawlers dock. In the South, the Wabi Shebelle and Juba banana plantations are also affected by the war. Both camps are only able to survive thanks to illegal trafficking and international aid.

In the North, in spite of the border being closed, Issaq nomads still manage to illegally transit their cattle into Djibouti to be sold there or to be re-exported to North Yemen. Imports, financed in the main by funds donated by the Issaq diaspora in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf countries, are transported via Assab and then sent to camps in Ethiopia (Harchin, Bele, Abokor, Arta Cheik and Balyeleh), where much trading takes place. Aid from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is used by both sides in the Somali civil war. The SNM creams off a certain amount of aid dispatched to refugees in Ethiopia (after the Ethiopian government has helped itself to its "share"), while the Ogadeni militia forces supporting the government in Mogadishu are fed on supplies arriving in Berbera. Outraged by these governments' misappropriation of aid, former director of the HCR, Jean-Pierre Hocke, wanted his organisation to withdraw from Somalia. His successor however, has decided that it will stay, and continues to wrestle with the same problems.

The survival of the regime in Mogadishu depends largely on economic aid from Italy, the last Western country to continue its support of Siad Barre's regime, "abandoned" by the United States. The Italian banana lobby which exerts a certain influence over Italian Government leader, Giulio Andreotti and the Italian Christian Democrats, has always resisted cutting off Italy's aid to Somalia. Last year, Catholic Africanist magazine, NIGRIZIA, strongly opposed to Siad Barre, was called to order by the Vatican and the publication's director was dismissed from his functions.

#### International Dimension

The SNM enjoys a certain amount of logistic support from Ethiopia while it is also able to use Ethiopian territory, to certain extent, as a rear base. But this support is limited and is never accompanied by arms supplies, except a meagre initial supply of light weapons in 1982 and 1983. The other guerilla movements have, for the time being, no external aid sources.

As regards the government in Mogadishu, it is becoming increasingly isolated, and this even more so since the United States, after having reduced, finally halted all aid. Out of gratitude for Mogadishu's help during the hijacking of the Lufthansa Boeing in 1977, West Germany aided Siad Barre's regime for a number of years. But even Bonn has pulled out, leaving Rome as Mogadishu's only source of European economic aid. Arms and oil come from various Arab countries, the greatest support provided by Saudi Arabia which financed acquisition of material in Mainland China, and recently in Rumania.

But, the downfall of Nicolae Ceaucescu, prevented supplies from effectively being delivered. Perhaps the uncertain political situation in Bucharest will give Ryaad the chance to renew its offers of aid.

The Emirate of Abu Dhabi has also delivered, on several occasions, second-hand equipment including four-wheel drive vehicles for artillery and a few old Centurion tanks. It also, for a long time, paid for Rhodesian and South African mercenaries who piloted and maintained Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers which the Emirate delivered to Mogadishu in 1982. It is also reported that Abu Dhabi is set to finance the Somali government's purchase of light weapons from China. Iraq is said to have also supplied some of its "leftovers" from the Gulf War. But, up till now, Libya has been Mogadishu's main supplier, having pledged to deliver 93 T-55 tanks (61 have already been received), and a large number of trucks equipped with Soviet light automatic ZUG guns. Reliable reports also allude to supplies of gas delivered in January 1989, as well as the recent arrival of ten Soviet Mi 25 fighter helicopters.

However, the fact that Tripoli received a delegation from the SNM in January this year may be the prelude to a change in Libya's stance. Meanwhile, in the name of solidarity between members of the Arab League, several Arab countries, but especially Saudi Arabia, have called upon Hassan Gouled to ensure that Djibouti remains, if not pro-Mogadishu, at least neutral in the Somali conflict.

#### Relations With Djibouti

Since the beginning of the conflict, Djibouti has been gripped by the fear of contagion. While 3,800 French soldiers protect the republic from any direct attacks, it can do nothing about subversion. In the beginning, President Hassan Gouled along with his Cabinet Director (his nephew), the highly influential Ismail Omar Guelleh, preferred to deal directly with Siad Barre for several reasons. First, solidarity between State leaders, second, for fear of the Somali Armed Forces, and also the fact that Mogadishu's anti-Issaq policy led to a complete freeze on the Port of Berbera, which encouraged trade from North Somalia to turn again towards its former rival, Djibouti.

In May 1989, when the SNM took Loyada and sealed off the Somali-Djiboutian border, President Hassan Gouled forbade any trading with the rebel zone. Djibouti lost about 40 percent of its trade volume, which, still now, has had a bad effect on the country's economy as a whole. Many transport, transit and trade firms have folded. The President is torn between the Issa (his father's clan), who support the SNM's cause, and the Gadabursi (his mother's clan) who support Mogadishu. The Gadabursi are freely funded by the Somali Embassy in Djibouti, and respond to every SNM victory by provoking trouble in specific districts of the city of Djibouti. Moreover, as the Gadabursi are not very strong in numbers and, as Djibouti's move towards neutrality is

worrying Siad Barre, he welcomed Hassan Gouled's Issa opponent, Omar Elmi Kaireh as well as militants from the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) led by former sultan Ali Mirah. There are Afar troops in Hargeisa and others in Borama which, it appears, have been trained to take up arms against Djibouti and perhaps for rebel action beyond the Gulf of Tadjora. The confused situation which prevails in the Danakil region of Ethiopia since the capture of Massawa by the EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front] may enable rear bases to be supplied sufficiently so as to carry out operations of this kind. But the counter-attack which the government forces are now involved in (see page 4) will perhaps alter the military balance in this area.

#### \* Chinese May Exchange Arms for Fishing Rights

34000598 London NEW AFRICAN in English  
Apr 90 p 19—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Richard Greenfield]

[Text] So great is President Siyad Barre's need for arms to fight the different guerrilla groups that he has entered into an agreement with the Chinese approving the transfer of national fishing rights for credit in hard currency. Meanwhile his government is staggering from crisis to crisis.

For five weeks Somalia had no effective government at all after President Siyad Barre sacked his entire cabinet. His first problem was to find a Prime Minister, but no one wanted the job and eventually Lt Gen Mohammed Samatar, was reinstated in the position from which he had been ignominiously dismissed. His task was then to pick a new cabinet, but suspicions about the President's rule were strong and few of the best men were tempted.

Many felt that the aged President should stand down before meaningful negotiations leading to the restoration of democratic consensus and human and economic rights, could even begin.

The Ambassador to the Court of St James in London was recalled and appointed Foreign Minister. The Prime Minister was among seven who retained their posts but the economic control of the family remained. For instance, General Mohamed S. Morgan, author of the famous "letter of death", became Minister of Public Works.

Meantime, however, the President remains obsessed with the need for arms to fight his civil wars in the north, south and center of the country. Last year he wrote to a number of Ministers and Directors-General approving the transfer of Somalia's fishing rights to China in return for armament credits. "The profits," he wrote, "shall cover the debts of the Somali Air Force to the Chinese government as well as those of the Somali Naval Forces and any other Somali forces which have enjoyed technical cooperation programmes for a long period."

#### Secret Letter

Siyad's letter, marked secret, was copied to the Chairman of the Bureau of Cooperatives and the Minister of National Planning, as well as to the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Commanders of the Air Force and Naval Forces. It referred to an agreement signed in Beijing on 10 February 1989, with the Chinese Import and Export Corporation concerning exchange of technology and specifically, a corporation known as Mimigabo International Technology Cooperative.

President Barre delegated all responsibility for the implementation of this agreement to the commanders of the Somali Air and Naval Forces. So great is his perceived need for arms that Chinese fishing ships are now allowed to fish in Somali territorial waters and freely use any harbour. They are exempt from tax on all material and personal effects and China receives most favored nation treatment. Chinese visitors can also pay for any purchase in local currency—which may not be so easy, since Somali banknotes are in short supply. Priority permission to open current accounts in both local and hard currencies was granted by the Somali Commercial and Savings Bank.

A new company, Mashruuca Shi-Sooma, has been formed with permission to purchase food, water, ice, fuel and all its needs from Somali markets. The company has permission to erect at its main office a VHF radio and telex and in fact any communication apparatus which it might need.

It is only in a footnote that the President apparently remembers his responsibility to the Somali nation. The last paragraph cautions that the governing board of the project should be presided over by a Somali officer and "a Somali Naval Officer should always be a member of the crew of the Chinese fishing boats in order to supervise the catches".

This may provide little safeguard, for many officers remaining in the service of the regime are not beyond taking money on the side.

A certain Col Mustafa and a Major Salim for example were included in a contract with a foreign oil company which guaranteed them substantial payments as liaison officers (five times those of the Somali project coordinator). This meant that for 21 days they were paid by a foreign company for supposedly looking after the national interest—a clear case of conflict of interest.

Contacted by phone, a former senior Somali diplomat remarked that the proper conservation of Somali's national resources and their exploitation in the interests of the public and the nation demand cleaner government than that which the present rulers seem capable or interested in providing.

## Tanzania

**President Calls for Japan's Economic Support**

OW1505030390 Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN  
in Japanese 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 7—FOR  
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By correspondent Satoshi Fukui]

[Text] Dar es Salaam, 10 May—Tanzanian President Mwinyi met with the news media, including MAINICHI SHIMBUN, at the presidential office in the capital on 9 May. In the interview, the president discussed the economic stagnation in Tanzania, which the United Nations rates as "one of the least developed countries in the world." He cited the oil crisis, the decline in prices of primary industrial products, and the rise in interest rates following the 1977 war against Uganda as reasons for the stagnation and appealed for understanding and support from Japan and other friendly nations in the West.

On the current economic situation in Tanzania, the president stressed that social services, in particular health and education, had deteriorated because of shortages in consumer goods, gasoline, and foreign currency. He said: "No more than 15 percent of the population has clean water supply." To cope with this situation, the Tanzanian Government agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on an economic rehabilitation plan (ERP) in 1986. However, on the other hand, international prices of coffee and cotton, Tanzania's major exports, rapidly dropped during the period—coffee to one-fifth and cotton to one-sixth, respectively.

**\* Mwinyi's Drive Against Corruption Questioned**

34000601B London NEW AFRICAN in English  
Apr 90 p 16—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By Charles Mmbaga; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] President Mwinyi has announced another drive against corruption. This time he is backed by the party and ministers will be carpeted to explain corruption in their own ministries. But will the new initiative work? asks Charles Mmbaga.

For the second time in less than five years President Ali Hassan Mwinyi has called for another major drive against corruption. Top government officials, including ministers have been asked to resign if they fail to eradicate corruption from their institutions.

The heads of parastatal companies have been asked to provide proper accounts, to straighten out their books and show whether they are making profits or losses. When the deadline was passed in mid-January only a fifth of the 246 registered state firms had complied with the President's demands.

The powerful National Executive Committee [NEC] of the Chama cha Mapinduzi party (CCM) has also thrown

its full weight behind the President at a recent meeting in Dodoma, the projected capital, where it discussed corruption for the first time.

The party is reeling from the public outcry over the cancer that is spreading like wildfire through the social fabric.

Recently Prime Minister Joseph Warioba, spoke out with scathing frankness: "Everywhere you go even in hospitals and schools, corrupting and corrupt people seem to rule the day."

He was fully backed by the part NEC at its six day Dodoma meeting. It announced that top ministers and executives would be summoned before the committee to be grilled on the conduct of their own departments. "Chief executives who fail to contain corruption in their work places will have to take political responsibility and resign even if they are not personally involved in corruption."

The NEC is also setting up a special commission to deal with the corruption problem. Meanwhile action is to be taken against the defaulting executives of over 160 parastatal companies who have not put their books in order or published accounts. It is likely that action will also be taken against the political appointees who are on the boards of directors of those companies.

President Mwinyi is known to be very angry indeed against this lack of accountability on the part of public servants. He may dismiss many managing executives and withdraw government subsidies from loss-making companies putting them out of business altogether. He may even attempt to privatise some of them providing he can get the full backing of the party.

Ordinary Tanzanians are complaining bitterly that they have been let down by their leadership. Even essential services such as education, hospitals, and police are up to their necks in corrupt practices. People who use government hospitals expect to have to bribe doctors and nurses before they can be treated.

Prime Minister Warioba said: "People are not used to this evil, when anyone goes to a dispensary he or she has to take extra money to give to the nurse or doctor so that they can be treated."

Mashauri Urrio, a businessman in the city, puts it this way: "Society is in a bad way when a sick man has to bribe his way to getting a few chloroquine tablets."

**Ministers Grilled**

Among those to be grilled by the NEC are the Minister of Health Aaron Chiude, Justice Minister Damian Lubva and Interior Minister General Muhidin Kimaroyo. Kimaroyo is due for a lot of questions concerning why his policemen makes a regular habit of asking for bribes in return for dropping charges. Health Minister Dr Chiude must explain what is going on in his hospitals and dispensaries. But most observers feel that though there

FBIS-APR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## EAST AFRICA

19

might be a lot of talk and recrimination there will be little action. No ministerial resignations are expected.

Indeed few Tanzanian ministers have ever resigned on a question of principle apart from President Mwinyi himself who took responsibility, when he resigned as Interior Minister, for police conduct in torturing to death suspects in Mwanza and Shinyanga in the '70s.

Mwinyi in his last drive against corruption flourished his "iron broom" as a symbol of his intent to cleanse the stable, but not the joke is Dar es Salaam is that the broom has gone rusty. "He seemed to have good intentions but he talks too much and takes too little action," said one public official, "the evil is so deep-rooted that the President cannot fight it alone."

The official organ set up under the Presidency called the Anti-corruption squad, is not dubbed the corruption squad by many. It appears to be a toothless body.

Premier Warioba insists that the war against corruption cannot be won unless the "whole nation" cooperates to fight it. He wants everyone to refuse to offer or take bribes. But the ordinary Tanzanian does not want to leave his children to die of malaria if they do not tip the doctors their "posho."

#### \* Foreign Investors Wait for 'Normal Economy'

34000612B London AFRICAN BUSINESS in English  
Apr 90 pp 49, 51—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Colleen Lowe Morna: "Investors 'Need To See a Normal Economy'"]

[Text] If proof is needed that Tanzania is now open for business, one sure indicator is the re-establishment of Tiny Rowland's Lonrho corporation in this East African country.

Lonrho's Tanzania holdings were nationalised in 1978 by the then President, Julius Nyerere, amid allegations surrounding Rowland's backstage involvement in the Rhodesian peace process. Negotiations for a return began in 1983.

The company came back in 1985 and is contemplating expansion under President Ali Hassan Mwinyi's three-year-old economic reform programme.

Much of Lonrho's current \$7m investment (about one-third the size of its former holdings) comprises compensation funds that have been tied up locally. Because this does not represent a new foreign-currency investment, it could take ten to 15 years before any of the profits pass through the "dividend pipeline" and translate into money paid back to the parent company, notes Lonrho Tanzania General Manager G. C. Theobald.

#### Lonrho's Long-Term Gamble

"It is a growth opportunity, and it's a long-term gamble," Theobald concedes. But then again, he adds: "Lonrho is well known for its ability to want to invest in Africa and

to invest in the long term—as witnessed, for example, by the company's operations in Mozambique."

Lonrho is far from being the biggest investor in Tanzania. It is dwarfed, for instance, by Shell Oil's \$100m drilling operation. However—apart from investments by the Aga Khan and the Tanzania Tourist Corporation—larger and foreign-based companies have been shy to test Tanzania out. Theobald contends that Lonrho is a useful pointer.

"We think that Tanzania has considerable potential," notes the youthful General Manager. "If we see it, the other companies say, 'Hmmm—Lonrho is seeing it—they are known to be risk takers and long-term strategists, so maybe there is an opportunity for us as well.'"

Lonrho came back in by way of repurchasing a 75 percent stake in one of its former companies, Mufindi Tea Company. The remaining 25 percent is held by the Tanzania Tea Authority.

In 1987, Lonrho bought another tea estate, Luponde, through Mufindi Tea Company. This, according to Theobald, is now "the world's only and first producer of organic tea" and is tapping a growing market in the West as the "green" craze catches on. The World Bank has recently provided a \$600,000 loan to develop the estate. The IFC [International Finance Corporation] and West Germany's DEG [expansion unknown] are expected to come up with further funding for their other tea estate, Itona, this year.

The company has also gone back into agricultural machinery and tractors, through a new company, Rid-doch Motors, set up in 1987. It has, however, not gone back into a number of former pursuits, like engineering and vehicle distribution.

Nonetheless, according to Theobald, Lonrho has its eye on coffee—an area where the UK's Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) is presently heavily involved—and tourism. Negotiations are currently under way with Zanzibar on the latter.

Like many other businessmen here, Lonrho's Tanzanian chief feels that the country should be a tourist destination in its own right and not merely "an adjunct to a Kenyan safari operation".

#### The Good News

Businessmen here are grateful for Mwinyi's efforts to free up their operating environment, though the reforms are being carried out at considerable social cost and have been a source of disagreement with Nyerere, who still wears the head-of-the-party hat.

Tanzania devalued the shilling again on 4 December, from Tsh157=\$1 to Tsh190=\$1, ahead of crucial negotiations with the IMF for a \$200m loan. This would be about four times the original loan and would mark the second phase of the ERP [Economic Recovery Program], the first phase of which officially ended in June 1989.

Business has benefited from increases in agricultural producer prices, from an easing up on bureaucracy (albeit at a slow pace) all—perhaps most important—from the removal of some trade and exchange restrictions. The latter include highly popular export-retention schemes and a World Bank-supported Open General Licence (OGL).

On the negative side, an investment code, promised in 1987 and important for would-be investors, is still undergoing discussion. Tanzania continues to have a huge balance-of-payments problem and is becoming increasingly indebted. Despite major rehabilitation work, the country's transport infrastructure remains woefully inadequate.

As in many countries undergoing structural adjustment, the private sector cannot lay its hands on sufficient credit. The banking system generally is in a mess. A presidential commission set up in August 1988 to study Tanzania's financial system is expected to present its findings shortly.

Events in Eastern Europe, and now in South Africa, make it imperative that Tanzania move fast on these fronts, notes Lonrho's Theobald. To be able to compete for scarce investment under these circumstances, he points out, "Tanzania will have to be seen as a normal economy in which to invest."

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

21

## \* Mandela Discusses International, Domestic Issues

90AF0135A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French  
7 May 90 pp 6-9—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Interview with Nelson Mandela in Umtata on 23 April by Marie-Roger Bilou; first six paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] I met Nelson Mandela. Nothing unusual for a journalist? Perhaps. But just this once, I would like to drop the blasé facade of a senior reporter and express something of what I felt.

Let me take you to Umtata, in Transkei, on 23 April. That is where I met Mandela, in the region where he was born. He was returning home for the first time in nearly 30 years. The Transkei is one of the "bantustans" which the white regime tried very hard to use, but in vain, to rid themselves of the blacks. The current leader of the Transkei, Bantu Holomisa, who replaced the little-missed Kaiser Matanzima in 1987, is immensely popular because of his stand in favor of rejoining his territory with South Africa and his support for the ANC [African National Congress].

Still fearing a last-minute cancellation, I enter the State Guest House, the residence for distinguished visitors, where Nelson Mandela is staying. There he is literally encircled, surrounded, and protected by a handful of formidable-looking men. But my worries are groundless: Shortly after 8:30 pm, I meet the ANC's vice president. We move into an office in the residence. His pace is slow, solemn.

He is a towering man, almost spindly in Abdou Diouf's way. He has an impressive air of serenity about him, in which traces of genuine stoicism are visible. How had his day gone? Like the others before it—an unending marathon of official ceremonies, crowds, and speeches. In spite of it all, this man in his 70s maintains his regal bearing, in contrast to the all-too-human leaders in today's world who are losing the ability to inspire awe. It is an understatement to say that Mandela is a living legend. He is aware of it; but not a fool, he is obviously determined above all to remain true to his convictions. Those convictions have not changed since his days as a young lawyer when he demanded equal rights for blacks and whites. "One man, one vote." Some thought that prison would break his dreams or turn this incorruptible man into a docile instrument of a solution concocted by the white regime; others want to "throw the whites into the sea." Both must be disappointed. Mandela's struggle does not concern itself with racial considerations. This giant's vision rises above the masses, if I may put it that way. Idealistic? Of course. But his goal is both more concrete and more complex: It is democracy, very simply....

Two and one-half months after his release, "comrade Nelson" (as his ANC friends call him) is far from having used up his "state of grace." The conservative Afrikaaner press can brandish all it likes the "Mandelian" specter of

nationalizations, or criticize him for being in Wembley while back in Natal, "blacks are killing blacks." Mandela, the mere image of him, continues to reassure. "What do they hope to gain by trying to discredit Mandela?" recently asked a "liberal" Johannesburg daily. "That he yield to the extremists in his camp?" Nonetheless, Gavin Relly, former president of Anglo-American, has embraced the demand for agrarian reform made by all the recently legalized parties. In a country where the law accords 87 percent of the land to whites (one-fifth the population), "political freedoms by themselves are of no consequence if they are not accompanied by economic opportunities for all, regardless of race," Relly has declared. But these statements of the obvious are perceived by Afrikaaners as inspired by a most aggressive brand of communism. In Soweto, the black suburb south of Johannesburg, and elsewhere in working class concentrations, a free Nelson Mandela, recognized and valued by his political opponents, inspires infinite pride and hope. When he speaks, children return to their classrooms. With Mandela, black majority rule has ceased to be a fiction. It should come as no surprise that there have been some half-humorous, half-emotional incidents, which certain whites have blown up out of proportion, frightening themselves. One example is the group of young Sowetans who surrounded a "liberal" journalist's car, saying they were going to "nationalize" it. And what about the "liberals?" White, mostly young, university graduates from well-to-do homes, they have traditionally been in favor of universal suffrage. Today, they are among the most "panic-stricken." The South African press is full of applicants for emigration. "Masters" are watching their servants out of the corner of their eye, thinking "They will take over our house once it is confiscated by a black government." Nearing the date for preliminary talks on ending apartheid—the "talks about talks"—De Klerk announced that one of the apartheid laws would be repealed—the "Group Area Act" which restricts blacks to certain residential areas, dividing families and turning citizens into exiles in their own country. That will mark the point of no return, to the great unhappiness of the right-wing extremists who are arming themselves in a frenzy and making it known that they are awaiting orders from their leader Eugene Terreblanche to open fire on the blacks "to defend their country."

This climate of unsettledness which precedes historic resolutions was the backdrop for my interview with Nelson Mandela. From time to time, a mischievous twinkle would appear in his eyes, a reminder that this son of a chieftain was once a very seductive man. Apartheid has robbed him of his best years and yet, Nelson Mandela has no bitterness whatsoever. He who could have made a decisive contribution to the democratization of South Africa 27 years ago (to think of the waste!) shows that he is ready. It is up to the white minority to seize this final opportunity.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] Has your morale been good since your release from prison? Haven't you felt some disappointment?

## REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

[Mandela] I found many changes in this country, some of them big changes. But they fall short of what we are demanding. We demand that every South African, white or black, have the right to decide his future. We are far from it. Hence the disappointment....

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] For the African states that are anxious to support your struggle, what attitude do you recommend that they take?

[Mandela] The only thing to do is to keep up pressure and isolate South Africa. International pressure has already made itself strongly felt. It should not let up in the future.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] What do you make of the "international visits" to South Africa being considered by certain heads of state, African heads of state in particular?

[Mandela] I don't recommend them! Because such visits could be interpreted rightly or wrongly as honoring a great event and, I emphasize, no such thing has taken place.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] Have you received invitations to travel to African countries?

[Mandela] Oh, yes! I have received invitations from all over—from Africa, from Europe....

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] From which African countries?

[Mandela] From all of them, practically, from all....

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] And you plan to accept them....

[Mandela] I leave on 10 May for Angola where I will spend 3 days. On the 13th, I will be in Nigeria, then on to Ghana, Algeria, and Egypt, before returning to my country. From 5 to 7 June, I will leave for Brussels, Paris, and London.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] Not a single French-speaking African country is included in your itinerary!

[Mandela] It may very simply have to do with the diversity of languages.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] Honestly? The French-speaking states are often accused of being less ardent supporters of the struggle against apartheid.

[Mandela] I do not share that opinion. Some French-speaking countries have acted very well. Our struggle is known in a country like Senegal and I found a great deal of support there. President Abdou Diouf has decided to name a street in Dakar after me and a square has been named Soweto....

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] What is your reaction to a meeting with De Klerk by Mobutu and Houphouet-Boigny?

[Mandela] On that, there are differing perceptions. We do not believe it is opportune for them to meet with De Klerk. I earnestly urge them to consult with the other

African countries before undertaking any action concerning South Africa. It is absolutely necessary that untimely initiatives be avoided. In fact, African states would be well advised to submit their ideas and plans to the OAU [Organization of African Unity] before acting on them. Africa would gain from it in cohesion and credibility.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] In your country, the young people are seen as more radical than you are. It must be difficult for you to contain their impatience....

[Mandela] Not at all! The younger generations everywhere are radical, but I do not believe our young militants are going too far. They listen to us, in any case.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] On the eve of the start of negotiations on 2 May, there is no lack of obstacles.

[Mandela] On 2 May preliminary talks will begin, in which we are going to prepare for the actual negotiations. We will have a number of problems to settle. For one, the government wants the heads of the six bantustans to participate along with their South African "doubles" as well as a series of people whom no one had ever heard of before and who are being made out to be the true leaders of the people!

The purpose of the move is clear: to put the ANC in a difficult position at the outset by trying to curtail its representation. We are asking that these delegates be chosen in a democratic—not racial—way, that is by universal suffrage.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] You have excellent relations with De Klerk. Isn't that strange?

[Mandela] Frederik de Klerk is an honest and sincere man. At least that is my belief. But the question arises as to whether he can carry the National Party (now in power—J.A. editor) on his shoulders. And it is understandable that we at the ANC cannot allow the future of our struggle to depend upon one individual, regardless of his integrity and importance.

When I was put in prison 27 years ago, I could not vote, the police were killing blacks in the street without provocation. White people were slaying blacks with impunity. None of that has changed today. Since my release from prison, the police—and not only the police—have killed dozens of blacks. In Sebokheng, in Wellkom, in Willstreet. We are not prepared to accept that state of affairs. In protest against these massacres, we refused to negotiate in April. We are continuing to search, however, for a peaceful settlement in place of mutual slaughter. By agreeing to open preliminary talks, we are earnestly trying to avoid finding ourselves in a situation of confrontation. We are working toward it, but the success or failure depends upon the government.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] You are in favor of nationalizations and much has been written in reaction to that. What sectors are targeted?

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

23

[Mandela] First of all, several forms of nationalization are possible, with the state owning 100 percent, 51 percent, or 33 percent. All of that will be decided when the time comes and, depending upon each case, the mines, banking institutions, and monopolies such as the gold and diamond industries, will be nationalized.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] Another sensitive area is agrarian reform.

[Mandela] It will be based on a principle of basic fairness and will give preference to people who actually work the land.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] Will there be expropriations?

[Mandela] Everything will be done through dialogue, but legal measures will be taken against anyone who will not cooperate.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] Let's talk about Margaret Thatcher, if you will.

[Mandela] Ah yes! (Laughter)

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] Your relations are not exactly at a high point....

[Mandela] I said yesterday that I hoped to meet Mrs Thatcher on 6 June so that we can harmonize our views.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] And do you seriously think you will change her mind on sanctions?

[Mandela] I will try to convince her in any case, and I hope to succeed.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] But why is Mrs Thatcher still so important in your eyes, while most countries are in favor of continuing the boycott?

[Mandela] Great Britain is an important partner to South Africa. We must do everything to win the support of the British Government for our cause, which already has the support of the warm and marvelous people of England.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] A word about perestroika: The ANC is allied with the South African Communist Party and the Soviet Union has always supported you. What is your analysis of the decline of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe?

[Mandela] You know, I confess that it is difficult for me to judge because I do not want to rely solely on the information published by the Western press. I would really have to visit these countries. Nonetheless, concerning Mikhail Gorbachev, I do not hesitate to say that there is a man who had the courage and honesty to recognize that the system to which he had devoted his life is in serious internal disarray. I would also like to hear the Western leaders acknowledge that the introduction of colonialism in Africa and elsewhere was the cause of irreparable damage....

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] You are so active, Mr Mandela, it is difficult not to feel some concern about your health.

[Mandela] Oh no, I am in very good health. My colleagues—(one of whom has just come in, looking pointedly at his watch—author's note)—take good care of me and make certain that I get my rest. That is why they are hurrying you....

[JEUNE AFRIQUE] You have no fear of being the target of an assassination attempt?

[Mandela] You know, the possibility always existed and still exists. But if one were fearful of it, one would not do anything.

### \* Need for Black Unity Before Negotiations Seen

90AF0029A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French  
19 Mar 90 pp 38-39—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Christian Casteran]

[Text] Slowly, things are falling into place: The ANC [African National Congress] is getting ready for negotiations. One decision was made, on 3 March in Lusaka: In the absence of the official ANC president, Oliver Tambo, partially paralyzed and hospitalized since August following a stroke, Nelson Mandela has become the de facto "head" of the ANC by officially being named vice president of the organization.

The seasoned leader will have to summon all his prestige, all his charisma, and all his authority to close the ranks of a still nebulous organization for which the prospect of negotiations and inevitable compromises can mean confrontations between opposing political alignments and deep dissension.

The ANC encompasses Marxists and nationalists, moderates and extremists, amid leadership conflict. Some reject any dialogue or compromise with the white power structure, and although it is becalmed for the present, the rivalry still lingers between militants both inside and outside the organization, and between 71-year-old Mandela's generation and that of self-styled successors Chris Hani and Thabo Mbeki, both under age 50.

Therefore, at its meeting in Lusaka, the ANC Executive Committee (NEC, the leadership in exile) accomplished more than a formality in offering Nelson Mandela the title of vice president of the organization. It gave itself, under the overwhelming authority of Nelson Mandela, the means to preserve the unity of the ANC along Mandela's pragmatic lines.

When he arrived in the Zambian capital on Tuesday, 27 February, Nelson Mandela was received in the manner of a chief of state. President Kenneth Kaunda introduced him as not only "the leader of the ANC," but also as "the leader of the South African people." "We love you," the Zambian president told his famous guest. "We are proud to welcome you here on behalf of the rest of mankind."

In Lusaka, 27 February was declared an official holiday as an appropriate welcome to this "great son of Africa," who last traveled outside his country in January 1962, eight months before his arrest. Everywhere, inside as well as outside South Africa, Nelson Mandela is thus welcomed with great respect and honor. There was no question for the ANC not giving him the leading role which he holds in reality.

#### Preserve the Unity of the ANC

There was not, however, any question of bypassing the rules of the organization. Thus, the NEC never considered naming "comrade Nelson" president: Such a decision can be made only by the movement's National Consultative Conference, set for next 16 December in South Africa. There was likewise no question of the NEC discarding president Oliver Tambo, victimized by illness, so gracefully.

The NEC's final communique also stated its conviction that Oliver Tambo will resume his office and functions eventually. The ANC leaders have indicated in recent weeks that Oliver Tambo, hospitalized in Sweden and expecting a visit from Nelson Mandela in the near future, was recovering rapidly from his stroke and that his return was therefore certain.

Then the problem of Nelson Mandela's role may arise. In any case, however, Mandela, who radiates a considerable aura, is and will be in reality the number one of the ANC. The NEC has already acknowledged this fact by creating the vice president's post expressly for him. The leadership in exile has also reinstated Walter Sisulu, 77, former secretary general of the ANC, and Govan Mbeki, 79, former ANC national president, as members of the NEC.

Probably no one else, of all the past leaders of the organization, is able today to impose "his line," made up of compromise and pragmatism, and make all the militants line up behind him. The NEC already has decided to transfer ANC headquarters to Johannesburg, a logical consequence of the organization's legalization on 2 February.

#### General Amnesty

The ANC has restated its conditions for the start of negotiations with Pretoria: In the eyes of the NEC, despite the "historic" liberation of Mandela, an event of "incontestable" importance, "most political prisoners are still being held." The NEC calls resolution of this problem "urgent" because of the hunger strike begun by 343 political prisoners (300 of whom are ANC members) incarcerated on Robben Island.

Mandela has called himself optimistic: "It would come as a surprise if we did not succeed in due course in removing these obstacles" to starting negotiations, he has said. In addition to the release of the political prisoners, the ANC is demanding the state of emergency be lifted. Mandela will need all his prestige to overcome the distrust of the militants outside the country toward

the good intentions boasted by President Frederik De Klerk. These militants long to return to the country. Not at any price, however. Under present circumstances, general amnesty is now a new condition.

Nelson Mandela has understood he must come to grips with the frustrations of the "military" wing (as opposed to the "diplomatic" wing) of the ANC. In Tanzania, where he stopped after Zambia, he faced thousands of guerrillas who have not left their training camps for years. Nor have they had the opportunity to "liberate" a single inch of territory. Now Mandela appears on the scene talking about negotiation and openly preaching an outstretched hand policy. Their frustration is understandable.

The most serious dissent comes from other antiapartheid liberation movements, however, notably from the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which split from the ANC in 1959. The PAC has reproached the ANC for a long time for "exchanging one oppressor for another when it traded Western imperialism for Soviet hegemony." With its hostility toward any collaboration with the Communist Party, the PAC now finds itself on an ultranationalist path.

In Harare 4 March, PAC President Zephania Mothopeng refused to attend the dinner in honor of Mandela given by President Mugabe. During the dinner, Robert Mugabe, although friendly to the PAC, called on all liberation forces in South Africa to "pool their forces....I say this because some are singing a different tune....We must not listen to the discordant voices who are criticizing the decision to negotiate...."

It is unlikely this appeal will be effective in reconciling the PAC and the ANC. The PAC, after a 3-day meeting, reaffirmed its opposition to negotiations with the white power structure as envisaged by Nelson Mandela.

The PAC, whose ban was lifted at the same time as the ANC's, is thus aligning itself with the PAM [Panafrikanist Movement] and with AZABO [Azanian People's Organization], a small antiapartheid group advocating armed conflict and rejecting all negotiations which can benefit "nothing but the interests of apartheid and imperialism."

"The PAC and the PAM think conditions are not now right for negotiations," stated the PAC secretary general. "We have decided to continue to fight on all fronts and to use the present situation to intensify the mobilization of the people inside the country and intensify the fighting in general." With these very small but also very active organizations heating up the debate, it is questionable if Nelson Mandela can unite the antiapartheid movements and present a united front to the white government.

If he is to do it, he will need a success soon so as to appease the militants who, like the PAC, have no confidence in Frederik De Klerk to dismantle apartheid. Nelson Mandela benefits from an incontestable state of grace. Goaded by more radical organizations, however,

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

25

he risks disappointing those who trust him now—the great majority—to draw tangible proof from Frederik De Klerk that a satisfactory agreement is possible. Nelson Mandela sees that here too, time is not necessarily in his favor. "In spite of the integrity of President Frederik De Klerk, which I do not question, I see that his government is still not ready to meet with us."

In the delicate balance prevailing between the ANC and Pretoria since last month, any loss for one side is a gain for the other. The risk now is shattering the fragile edifice and seeing everyone tumble, leaving the field free for the ultras. Thus the coup d'etat put down 3 March in Ciskei, the Bantustan declared "independent" by Pretoria in 1981, constitutes a success for the ANC but at the same time brings the South African Army and antiriot police into the spotlight.

The young militants who overthrew the "president for life," Lenox Leslis Wongama Sebe, unseated a "collaborator." The spokesperson for the rebels, surrounded by

local ANC militants, speaking to a crowd waving the ANC flag, did not hide his desire to see Ciskei rejoin South Africa, aligning himself thus with the ANC's positions, always opposed to the institution of the black Bantustans created by Pretoria under its policy of apartheid.

South Africa, to prevent riots, sent units of soldiers and police to the area. Pik Botha, foreign minister, gave assurances nevertheless that no military intervention was planned against the putschists but said the national security council "is following developments very closely." The situation helps weaken De Klerk's authority with his army and the extreme right. Mandela and the ANC know they can get nothing from De Klerk if his position is weakened. It is not yet. But the time probably has come, before the delicate balance tips, to set a date for the negotiations that are today still hypothetical.

**Angola****Presidency, Security Ministry Said in Conflict**

AB1005180290 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French  
7 May 90 p 14—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[From the "Exclusive Reports" column]

[Text] The conflict between the Presidency and the Cuban-controlled Ministry of State Security (political police) has intensified. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has instructed one of his trusted men, Fernando Piedade, and the heads of the military counterintelligence to "neutralize" the action of Security Minister Kundi Paihama who has not hesitated to tap the telephones of government members.

**\* Efforts To Negotiate Without Mediator Viewed**

90AF0110A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French  
30 Apr 90 p 28-31—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] are about to enter unmediated negotiations, just as their respective allies want it.

Mobutu Sese Seko is out of a job. When one party in the Angolan conflict (the government of Luanda) rejected his mediation services, he was removed from the picture. At least he will have helped the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA, brothers turned enemies, to decide in favor of direct talks, with no intermediary. But he is enraged nonetheless, having worked as he did, at the suggestion of the same government, to find "an African solution" to the 15-year-old civil war.

May 16, 1989. In Luanda, the Angolan president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, is holding a conclave with seven African heads of state: Omar Bongo (Gabon), Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique), Manuel Pinto da Costa (Sao Tome & Principe), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), and Denis Sassou Nguesso (Congo). From the meeting would emerge talk of the Angolan Government's "will for peace" albeit with the following restrictions added by Dos Santos: "While searching for peace, we will continue to fight the war to defend our conquests and neutralize the enemy's military plans."

In reality, given the prospect of the total withdrawal of its 60,000 Cuban allies by 1995 under the New York agreements of December 1988, the Angolan Government was in a hurry to make peace. It had a plan and the seven leaders meeting in Luanda asked Zaire's president to make it a reality. "You have relations with UNITA and the United States, which is backing UNITA," they told Mobutu. "You are the only one who can bring Savimbi to agree to this plan."

The main points of the plan were to bring UNITA into the Angolan Government and to make UNITA's leader an offer of exile in comfort with \$10 million to be paid by Luanda. "I cannot guarantee that your plan will be accepted. I will take your plan, but I will also find out what UNITA's plan is. Let me draw up a 'Mobutu plan' based on the two of them."

One month later, on Tuesday, 20 June 1989 in his "village of birth," Gbadolite, Mobutu met with the head of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi. Without revealing the entire MPLA plan to him, Mobutu felt him out on the possibility of an "honorable peace." Savimbi saw it as an attempt to be rid of him. He refused, retorting with: "Why do you want us to agree to this plan? Did we lose the war? No!" And he went on to suggest his own plan which called in particular for free elections to be held in Angola.

A realist, Zaire's president grumbled, "You are not being reasonable! The day after tomorrow, I will be meeting here with several African heads of state who, like me, do not allow elections in their own countries, which have only one political party, and you want to talk elections to them! Don't bring that kind of talk here!" Savimbi agreed: "Let's leave that for another time." That same day in Lusaka, the Angolan minister of foreign affairs, Pedro de Castro "Loy van Dunem," meeting with Zambia's president, Kenneth Kaunda, declared "It is out of the question for us to talk to the rebels!"

Jonas Savimbi returned to his stronghold, Jamba, a small city of 15,000 in southeastern Angola and the "provisional capital" of his movement. He convened UNITA's central committee which, since it did not know what the MPLA's specific proposals were, recommended that its leader not attend the summit called by Mobutu in Gbadolite and inform the U.S. Government.

Overnight, Jonas Savimbi traveled to Johannesburg accompanied by Miguel Nzao Puna, the party's general secretary; Tony Fernandez da Costa, chairman of the External Relations Commission; and Jorge Valentin, information secretary. From there, he telephoned Herman Cohen, the American assistant secretary of state for African affairs, about the MPLA plan. Cohen knew as much as he did. "Precisely because we know nothing about it ourselves, my central committee does not want me to go to Gbadolite. You owe it to them to be there. The absent are always in the wrong." Still late into the night, a call came from Mobutu, who must have been contacted by Cohen. Tony da Costa was the only one available. "Put Savimbi on the plane!" Mobutu ordered. "Otherwise, you will have to answer to history! Call me whatever the hour." And he gave "Tony" his direct number to call via satellite.

At 0400 hours on 22 June, the decision was made: Savimbi would go to "Gbadolite" accompanied by Tony da Costa and by Jorge Valentin. Michel Muna would return to Jamba to explain the about-face to UNITA's central committee. Tony da Costa woke up the South African

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

27

minister of foreign affairs, "Pik" Botha, to announce UNITA's decision to attend the Gbadolite summit and asked him to find them a plane for hire. "Pik" objected: "You are insane to go there! You are putting your head into the lion's open mouth. You will be arrested!"

**Runway Duty**

Savimbi grabbed the telephone: "Who will dare arrest me and what prison will they take me to? We are leaving. Hire us a plane!"

For the entire morning of Thursday, 22 June 1989, the Zairian president, Mobutu Sese Seko, would be "stationed" on the tarmac at Gbadolite's airport to welcome his peers. The list is impressive: Jose dos Santos from Angola, Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira from Guinea-Bissau, Quette Masire from Botswana, Pierre Buyoya from Burundi, Paul Biya from Cameroon, Aristides Pereira from Cape Verde, Andre Kolingba from Central African Republic, Denis Sassou-Nguesso from Congo, Omar Bongo from Gabon, Moussa Traore from Mali, Joaquim Chissano from Mozambique, Ibrahim Babangida from Nigeria, Juvenal Habyarimana from Rwanda, Manuel Pinto da Costa from Sao Tome & Principe, Kenneth Kaunda from Zambia, and Robert Mugabe from Zimbabwe. Along with their Zairian host and two delegates (the Moroccan Ahmed Osman, leader of parliament, and the Tanzanian Idris Abdoul-Wakil, second vice-president), they were supposed to witness a historic event: the "reconciliation" between the Angolan brothers turned enemies, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Malheiro Savimbi. But history did not keep its appointment with them.

Jonas Savimbi arrived in the early afternoon on an unregistered South African plane. Not a head of state, he was greeted by Nkema Liloo, special adviser to the Zairian president, who promptly escorted him to Mobutu's palace. Mobutu gave him another warning: "Above all, don't talk about elections. You will put all these people ill at ease!" Savimbi promised and withdrew while the 18 heads of state shut themselves away for 3 hours to hear the "Mobutu plan." "I have taken the MPLA and UNITA proposals and identified three common points. Both are in favor of an immediate cease-fire, national reconciliation, and to open direct negotiations. Let us help the Angolan Government and UNITA find a framework for discussions."

When Savimbi was brought into the conference room, he was impressed. Not in 14 years had he seen so many heads of state assembled, not since 1976, when the OAU was arguing over whether or not to admit Angola. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, the most senior in age, presided over the session. He addressed Savimbi with authority: "You will become part of the legal government. We condemn outside interference in the conflict." Omar Bongo interrupted him: "Not at all, Kaunda. We exchanged views on outside interference but reached no agreement on the subject."

Savimbi had a dislike for the Zambian president, Kaunda, who had been one of his first allies, but later tried to have him arrested and turned over to the Luanda authorities. Although he speaks good English, the Angolan spoke French so as not to answer him. He addressed his remarks especially to the French-speaking heads of state: "I have come to listen carefully and respectfully to what you have to say. The eyes of all the world are focussed on Gbadolite. Help us to find a solution that will honor Angola and Africa."

Moussa Traore, then acting president of the OAU [Organization of African Unity], exclaimed, "If I had known that Savimbi was like this, I would have agreed to talk to him long ago." The less enthusiastic but more battle-seasoned Ibrahim Babangida from Nigeria in turn said, "It is wrong to impose a magic solution—which does not even exist—on the Angolans. In Nigeria, we too had a civil war and secession. There is no secession in Angola, but there is a civil war. Let the Angolans find their own solution. Let's help them to find a framework in which they can come together, but let them talk among themselves."

And the three-point Mobutu plan was accepted by Jose dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi: the desire to achieve national reconciliation; a cease-fire as of 24 June 1989; and the creation of a commission under the aegis of the mediator, Mobutu, to prepare for direct negotiations. A consensus could not be reached on a fourth point: UNITA refused to "participate" or "be integrated" into the Luanda government or the Armed Forces. To try to convince UNITA, Mobutu tried his hand at semantics: "You are interpreting that as Portuguese-speakers would. But in French, the words participation and integration do not have the same meaning at all." Savimbi answered that he was familiar with the language of Voltaire: "We want a government of national union to be formed immediately. Our integration into the current government is out of the question." Jose dos Santos also refused. The subject would come up again later.

**A Historic Photo**

The heads of the two negotiating parties were designated: Franca Ndalou, chief of staff, for the MPLA; and Jorge Valentin, information secretary, for UNITA.

The stage was set, everything was ready for the show, the "historic" photo of Savimbi and Dos Santos shaking hands. Dos Santos expressed reluctance at the last minute, saying to Mobutu, "Don't bother to call in the photographers. I first have to report on developments to my comrades in Luanda." The photo was taken, however, and it is all that remains of the meeting in Gbadolite.

During the entire month of July 1989, rumors abounded. The government and the rebels mutually accused each other of violating the cease-fire of 24 June. Mobutu himself let it be believed that a secret agreement had been drawn up in addition to the three-point Gbadolite plan. And the rumor that Savimbi had agreed to go into

exile in exchange for \$10 million made the rounds of embassies around the world. On 6 August, the UNITA leader issued a denial at a rally in Jamba and virtually accused the Zairian head of state of lying.

Mobutu was furious and suspected Ivory Coast president Houphouet-Boigny of having "turned" Jonas Savimbi. Houphouet had been invited to the Gbadolite summit, but "not feeling well," he declined. He did meet with Savimbi, however, on 2 August—4 days before Savimbi issued his scathing denial. Over the next few weeks, Mobutu appealed to the other heads of state, pointing a finger at Houphouet as the one who "ruined it all!" He also referred to the Ivory Coast's president by a less than respectful term, now famous among the heads of state, but one that decency will not allow us to reprint here....

For his part, Jonas Savimbi had in fact decided to turn the page opened at Gbadolite. He had proof that the Angolan governmental forces were preparing a large-scale offensive against UNITA's positions. He relayed the information to the American Herman Cohen, who did not believe it. On 14 October, he was received by Mobutu Sese Seko at his residence in Cap-Martin, in the south of France. The two men finally had an opportunity to sort things out. Very nobly, Mobutu reassured him: "Let's put all of that behind us. I did not feel insulted and I realize that you had to deny the rumors. You are a fighter and it would be an insult to you to attempt to buy your exile. In fact, I never mentioned it to you for that reason." Savimbi confessed his concern to the Zairian president: "The MPLA is preparing a large-scale offensive against us. They never wanted a cease-fire! They are getting ready for war."

On 21 December, history would prove Savimbi right. From their base at Cuito-Cuanavale, the governmental forces bore down on UNITA's strategic base at Mavinga, 135 km to the east. Christened the "Last Assault" the offensive was the first of such magnitude in 15 years. 12,000 men were sent in, preceded and protected by 400 armored vehicles, supported by MI-35 combat helicopters and MIG-23 and SU-25 bombers. UNITA's forces were given their first taste of BMP-1 amphibians which pushed back and broke through their lines of defense to position themselves to allow the infantry through. "Before that, the infantry would engage combat and protect the armored vehicles; this time, it was the other way around," we were later told by General Huambo, chief of UNITA's military intelligence. The rebel forces retreated to within 10 km of Mavinga.

The governmental forces—FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola]—encircled the base. To the north, the First AGRP (the equivalent of an army corps); to the south, the Sixth Tactical Group. At Dinde, midway between Cuito-Cuanavale and Mavinga, another group controlled the resupply routes. The objective was to take the landing strip at Mavinga to facilitate the resupply of troops in the field and from there, to swing south and move on UNITA's other bases. "Likwa, and—why not?—Jamba. The operation was

coordinated from Cuito-Cuanavale by General Franca Ndalu, the same person chosen by the MPLA to head its delegation to the negotiations with UNITA. The government's high command was absolutely certain of victory: The combat groups carried only a 30-day reserve of food and ammunition....It announced the capture of Mavinga, the defection of General Chitunda, vice-president of UNITA, who was said to have left for Botswana with 500 men, and no less than the evacuation of Jonas Savimbi, who had been wounded, it seemed, in Jamba during the bombing. [quotation marks as published]

### We Will Destroy Them...

These cries of victory were premature. And totally misleading.

After retreating, the UNITA forces had reorganized into guerrilla units which counter-attacked by besetting the governmental resupply convoys, in turn encircling the units isolated from each other. Three months later, the offensive had failed. UNITA had retaken the position at Dinde and the groups posted around Mavinga were cut off from supplies. Secret diplomacy was to resume its role, but circumstances had changed: Having failed to consolidate its positions with a military victory, the Luanda government now found itself cap in hand.

On 5 March, Jonas Savimbi (who had not been wounded) made a proposal: "If the MPLA's forces voluntarily leave their positions around Mavinga and return to their base in Cuito-Cuanavale, we will let them through and we will agree to a cease-fire. But if they do not leave, we will fight them and we will destroy them systematically." Ten days later, UNITA's leader secretly met "somewhere" with a high-ranking Cuban delegation. "We did not approve of the offensive," they said. "The MPLA's forces do not have the means to drive out UNITA." True or false, the remark was confirmed in the field and in the diplomatic efforts that were to begin.

On 19 March, while passing through Luanda while the fighting continued to rage, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Edward Shevardnadze, let drop the following brief sentence: "It is not impossible that the war will be over by June."

### Mobutu's Sermon

Two days later, in the shadow of the celebration of Namibia's independence, Jose dos Santos met South African president Frederik De Klerk in Windhoek and suggested that he convey his latest proposals to Savimbi: The governmental forces are ready to withdraw from the Mavinga front, but UNITA must pledge to withdraw its commandos which, having penetrated into Luanda, are continuing to sabotage electrical facilities and water lines; direct but secret conversations could take place in Sal, Cape Verde. But Savimbi had already refused: "Why secret conversations? Let's first silence the guns, then let's talk, but not in hiding." A week later in Kinshasa, the UNITA leader was given a sermon by the "mediator" Mobutu Sese Seko and the American secretary of

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

29

state James Baker: "You are now in a position of strength, since you have driven back the MPLA's offensive. Don't overdo it! We will not be able to support you if you choose to be stubborn."

Savimbi knew that the Americans wanted negotiations. But he also knew Washington's ultimate goal: the formation of a national reconciliation government in Luanda. UNITA was in favor of that, particularly since its leaders—just like the MPLA's leaders—realized that a military solution was not possible. UNITA would never gain control of Luanda, even though its commandos had penetrated the capital and the MPLA would never reach Jamba. Above all, the Angolan population on both sides of the war were tired and the allies of both sides wanted to see it end.

All the stronger for having held firm militarily, Savimbi conceded in late March: UNITA was ready for direct and immediate negotiations and was even dropping its demand that the MPLA forces—which were by then inoperative, it is true—withdraw from the Mavinga front; UNITA refused however to halt activities by its commandos in Luanda. On 6 April, the proposal was received loud and clear. After a minisummit in Sao Tome attended by Omar Bongo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso and Manuel Pinto da Costa, Jose Eduardo dos Santos stated that he wanted "to give priority to direct contacts" between his government and the rebels. Exit Mobutu the mediator and, by the same token, the possibility of any other African intermediary. The two delegations would meet in Lisbon. New plenipotentiaries were selected: Petro de Castro "Loy" da Costa, minister of foreign affairs, for Luanda; and Andolosio Mango, representative in Bonn prior to his precipitous posting to Lisbon, for UNITA.

Peace would prove to be more difficult than war. UNITA has demanded that the current Constitution be revised, that the notion of a party-state be laid to rest, that a multiparty system be instituted and that elections be organized to allow the expression of all political views. The governing officials in Luanda have suggested for the time being that a national reconciliation government be formed with UNITA participating.

Points of agreement can arise. At least the two parties are agreed to stop the fighting. UNITA may agree to postpone the question of elections on the condition that a transitional government be installed with responsibility for preparing and opening the process of constitutional reform. The current government is therefore living on borrowed time, all the more so since a consensus may form around Joaquim Pinto da Costa as the future head of government. A priest (yes, indeed...), Da Costa was one of the MPLA founders before becoming the driving force of the movement "Active Revolt" in the late 1970s which attempted a coup d'Etat against the current party leaders. Protected by his priesthood, he managed to leave Angola after the plot was uncovered to settle in Lisbon. Since the beginning of the year, a group has formed around Joaquim Pinto da Costa: The Civic

Action Association, a political party that is still not advertising its existence. Jonas Savimbi has suggested the priest as head of government. Jose Eduardo dos Santos has not come out against the idea, knowing that UNITA agrees to his remaining head of state for the transition period.

Peace has not yet been sealed in Angola, but it is within reach. It is in the interests of the MPLA to gain time so that it can extend its organization across a country it never totally controlled. UNITA refuses to participate for very long in a transition government which it feels should not shoulder the legacy of the current leadership: military debts to the USSR and Cuba; an economy drained by 15 years of war; not to mention an agricultural sector that can no longer guarantee the survival of the population. Two unknowns remain. The first is how intransigent UNITA will be, tempted as UNITA is to expand the negotiations to include other Angolan political movements so that together they can draft a Constitution—at least a provisional one—establishing the deadlines for elections. The second is how unified MPLA leadership will be in its thinking. Says Savimbi with a laugh, "We know who the hawks are, but we don't know where the doves are!" In short, it is up to Dos Santos to convince his comrades to make peace. But that is another...war.

#### \* Savimbi Discusses Peace Process, Support

34000583 London AFRICA EVENTS in English  
Apr 90 pp 19-20—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Interview with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi by George Ola Davies]

[Text] I have been right up to the front at the time of a serious offensive, which, at one stage, was extremely critical for UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. I must say, in as much as your troops have a kind of rugged determination, it appears that the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] has the upper hand now.

No, I disagree. Right now the MPLA are retreating. Firstly when they launched their offensive, they had marked the January 10 to take over Mavinga. When that failed, they postponed it to the 13 and much later, to the 20. Now we know that they are reorganizing themselves to get out of the area because we have cut off their source of supply.

How did you do that?

We have forces between Cuito Cuanavale and Chambinga. So when the MPLA forces advanced to the Ngombe area, they could not receive what they had in Cuito Cuanavale because we ambushed their convoy of supplies right in the middle.

As things are, there is a tendency to believe that neither the MPLA nor UNITA has absolute confidence in President Mobutu as a mediator. Why is this so?

We (UNITA) have full confidence in him. As I have explained before, we had problems of the interpretation of the Gbadolite talks. We voiced our discontent, and that has been cleared up. We have full confidence in him as a mediator. As for the MPLA, I cannot speak on their behalf.

Apart from South Africa offering itself as a transit point for visitors to your territory, what other forms of support do you still get from Pretoria?

I think this question of South Africa has been pursuing us for a long time and, fortunately, to day everybody knows that after the signing of the December Accord—which provided the platform for the Cubans withdrawal from Angola—and the independence of Namibia, South Africa ceased to give us any kind of support at all. They just cannot, simply because of the Accord, and they had informed us long before. We are also not looking for any other form of support except the transit facilities that are not organized by the government of South Africa but by private Portuguese citizens there; and we pay for these services.

With Namibia gaining its independence, it is evident that UNITA will be having a second unfriendly neighbor; Zambia being the other. With the kind of relationship building between SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] and Luanda, what other strategic problems will Jamba be faced with apart from the Namibian border being closed as a transit route for supplies of all sorts to your territory? And what other alternatives have you thought about?

We hope that the leaders of Namibia, whom we have worked with in the past, before Namibia went into the map of the world, and before SWAPO became a big organization between 1966 and 1974, will think properly before they act. They have been working with us, and I believe we still have friends within SWAPO. I think those forces are going to work for moderation so that the new independent country will try to tackle all their own problems. They will have many, I can assure you. They are not going to meddle in the Angolan problem. This is my conviction.

Going by precedence, it seems as if there is no solution to the Angolan problem in sight, since both parties do not want to give in for fear of being classified as weak. Have you thought of any other sacrifice which might just be seen, not as a face-losing act, but one, which, in the name of peace, Luanda might laud?

I think in the name of peace everybody has to make some sacrifice.

What is your sacrifice?

My sacrifice is that we are prepared to stop fighting when the MPLA stops. The MPLA wants to prove to the world that since we now receive no more support from South Africa, we cannot cope. They continue to receive billions of dollars in weaponry from the Russians. Even now.

Do you have proof of that?

Yes we do. All the visitors, our own people in Luanda, see the planes landing everyday and they are loading tanks. Suddenly, I think that the MPLA wants to prove through that that UNITA is no longer a viable force. It has been proved that we will remain a viable force. Therefore, the sacrifice that we are prepared to reach is to say: Let us stop fighting and discuss how we should organize ourselves.

For UNITA, after fighting for 15 years, to accept the MPLA government as it is, is impossible. Our people from Cabinda, Cunene, Luanda—in fact from all over the country—will refuse to accept such a thing. We are also asking the MPLA for sacrifice. Let them open up. The time has come, even for (the whole of) Africa, to have a multi-party system. It has to come. They have no other way.

Apart from the United States' annual support of \$15 million to UNITA, what other nations assist you, and in what form does this aid come?

African friends who are sympathetic towards UNITA are known. I am not going to mention them because I know they are not unknown. They receive us openly and we give press conferences in their capitals.

One country that we all know is Zaire, but there has been some friction between your organization and Kinshasa.

I don't think that it is Zaire. Let us say, Cote d'Ivoire. This was where I gave my very first open press conference on my return from a United States tour. The President (of Cote d'Ivoire) gave a gesture of fraternity, he gave me his plane and everybody saw the plane going around with me. Then there is Morocco. The Moroccans have never made a secret of their support for us. Through them we get across to the Arab nations who give their contributions. They give money for our struggles.

And apart from money?

They give money and with money we buy medicines and some other items that we need.

Where do you get your arms from?

Today you get your arms from anywhere, as long as you have the money. Secondly, we capture a lot of arms from the enemy itself.

UNITA runs a cashless economy, but surely the organization must have a budget. How much does the war cost you and how is the rest of the money spent?

Everybody (in UNITA) is working without a salary. This is not because of a system we would like to create; it is the sacrifice for the liberation of the country. The budget could be in the vicinity of US\$100 million annually, sometimes less. It all depends on circumstances. It is not weapons that take the bulk of the money. The money is

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

31

spent on clothing, medicine and schooling for the people we have here. As for weapons, as I have told you, we capture a lot everyday.

I find it strange and hard to believe when UNITA officials all over the place say to me that the organization does not run short of fuel. They tell me there is enough of it in stock for years to come. What is the true picture of things here, given that you claim not to receive supplies from South Africa?

From South Africa? It is evident that if we did receive oil from them, Namibia would be the first, and the United Nations next, to say that tankers are running through Namibia.

Botswana, quietly, perhaps?

No. We have proved here that you can stock oil for at least a year; and since our friends stopped giving us oil, we have not run out yet.

Give, you said.

Supply.

When was the last time you got supplied?

The last time was in December last year when we signed the agreement. Secondly, I can give you an example of how we get the rest. Recently, the MPLA sent ten tankers, each with 40,000 liters, to their troops at the Mavinga front; only two reached. The rest fell into our hands. That means we have enough to supply our front for now.

The recent replacement of your army Chief of Staff, General Omostillo Chilingutula, at such a crucial time in the middle of a difficult offensive, paints a picture of discontent somewhere; a crack in UNITA's walls, if you like. What informed this sudden change?

This change was discussed as far back as April last year during the general conference of the armed forces. All the commanders were present. We said at the time that the trend of the war was changing, and so we must prepare ourselves for it. We said that one of these days we are going to play more politics than war. When we looked at things, we saw that the best cadres we have are the army, and not in the party with the Secretary-General. We then decided that it was better that in the army, among the general staff, we should start to give some of our best cadres to the Secretary-General, which you will agree with me is a very difficult task indeed.

The first person we thought of changing was Chilingutula, who had been Chief of Staff twice. He is the only one with the sort of authority to talk to the boys and say, "You've been a Captain, but if you go as an administrator within the party, you will not be losing anything." He will now negotiate with the Secretary-General because we have decided to give 5,000 cadres to the Secretariat.

As for the new Chief of Staff, General Arlino Pena Ben Ben, he has for long been one of our best operational leaders. He fought in Luanda, Cabinda, everywhere. If you take 5,000 men from the army and declare them civilians, you need another respected General to keep the forces formidably together, hence we chose him. We do not have any crisis. We just feel that a ceasefire is close by. We do not want to be caught unawares.

I used to say to my soldiers: "Fight, it is a good, but one day you will have to drop your guns. You'd better prepare yourself now for a new job and a new style of life".

President Eduardo dos Santos (of Angola) has ruled out UNITA's participation in the forthcoming general elections. Will you in any way be disrupting the polls?

No. There will be no polls. We know there will be no polls. Without UNITA, there will be no polls. He has no population. They tried to conduct some form of elections in the past. You know the participation? 0.3 percent. So they stopped. There will be no polls, so there will be no need for disrupting anything. That is what I classify as the first cards that you have to play before the trumpcard. The trumpcard is coming.

Why does the MPLA hate Dr Jonas Savimbi?

It is better to ask them, not me. Jonas Savimbi does not hate them. They may have one reason or another, but I can tell you that if Dr Agostinho Neto (the first President of Angola) was still around, it would have been different.

### \* Reporter Recapitulates War Scenarios

90AF0068A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French  
16 Apr 90 pp 30-33—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by special correspondent Sennen Andriamirado: "Angola: A Truly Deadly Peace;" first paragraph is JEUNE AFRIQUE introduction]

[Text] As prospects for a settlement are getting closer, the adversaries are mobilizing the most devastating of weapons—including chemical warfare.

Jamba, headquarters of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] forces in the South-eastern Angolan bush, 13 March 1990. At exactly 0745 hours the alarm was sounded in this small town of 15,000 inhabitants where I had arrived 6 hours before. Two Sukhoi-25 bombers released their missiles of death. I personally saw three of them explode, but an hour after the bombings UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi assured me that there had been four.

The next day I could see the point of impact of two of the bombs, 3 km east of Jamba. They did not do any damage—this time—but the first, several breech pieces of which I saw, left a sort of whitish foam on the soil of the bush, the characteristic sign of a phosphorus bomb, according to UNITA officers. And yet, the grass and brush were only burned off within a radius of 10 meters

surrounding the point of impact, whereas a phosphorus bomb is supposed to burn a considerably larger surface area. It was definitely a chemical bomb, but one whose type the engineers, pyrotechnists, and chemists have not yet been able to determine.

The second bomb was even more bizarre. In addition to the minibomb breech pieces that it contained, it left a substance that had the consistency and color of the cow dung under which they had just grilled cassava or corn: blackish and spongy. General Renato, operations chief on the FALA (Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) General Staff, confided to me: "This is the first time we've seen this type of bomb." At any rate, this bomb had certainly been dropped the night before—I saw and heard it explode—it was not used to burn or kill, but it certainly must serve some purpose. Now or later. For now, I noticed a shrub near the "cow dung" that seemed to have been severely shriveled, but which had not been burned.

I saw the victims of the bombs in Jamba itself and in the surrounding areas, like at the Likuwa logistics base 200 km and 8 hours of sandy trail—in the middle of the night, to avoid the bombings—northwest of the UNITA "capital." At Jamba General Hospital, as at the physiotherapy center in Bihonge 90 minutes away by trail, I saw blind and paralyzed soldiers who had inexplicably lost both their minds and their ability to speak.

#### **Burned With Phosphorus**

A young soldier 26 years of age, Zacharia Carveto, seemed to have been suddenly afflicted with Parkinson's disease. Adriano Jamba, 43, had been burned with phosphorus: His right side had been "grilled" with third-degree burns and his left hand had literally "melted." But these casualties had been wounded in 1984 or 1986.

The only chemical bomb victim I have come across since the beginning of the present campaign (21 December 1989) is Alberto Campos. Twenty-six years of age, he was wounded on 18 February 1990 on the Mavinga front, 30 hours of trail—at a forced march pace—northwest of Jamba. Since then, his lower limbs have become paralyzed. Maybe he is a good actor and Dr Adelino Manassas, who introduced me to him, is a good director. But I personally saw the remains of the "fresh" chemical bombs because they were staring me in the face.

What kind of bombs were they? Dr Manassas, the director of Jamba General Hospital, to which young Alberto had been evacuated, stated that a test made of his blood revealed traces of cyanide. I don't believe that at all. Cyanide kills immediately. This is the testimony of Alberto Campos himself: "On 18 February I was on patrol when the bombers arrived. I saw the bombs explode in the air before hitting the ground. I detected the odor of piri-piri (pimento) and I passed out. I woke up in the field hospital and I couldn't move my legs any more." A captain whom I met at Likuwa Regional

Hospital in turn told me: "I was hit in 1986. I had barely enough time to detect a strong odor of pimento and corroded batteries. I had the impression that my chest was suddenly constricted and I passed out." Since then, he has been suffering from terrible headaches and no longer has any control over his motor nerves.

#### **Ridiculous Shield**

There is not much that UNITA forces can do to protect themselves from chemical bombs. Since their 23-mm antiaircraft guns cannot reach enemy bombers that fly at an altitude of at least 9,000 meters, they fire on the bombs before they hit the ground. Sometimes that works. A ridiculous shield: In the event of a bombing, soldiers and civilians have to jump into their individual "holes" and protect their eyes, noses, and mouths with a damp cloth. But this kind of protection is very chancy since some gases penetrate all the pores.

The million and a half inhabitants of the area controlled by UNITA in the southwestern part of Angola are threatened with another danger: force of habit. By dint of being subjected to bombs, some civilians do not take any precautions. On 14 January 1990 a teacher and five pupils were killed by the same fragmentation bomb at the secondary school in Luenge near Likuwa. While the alarm siren was blaring, the teacher, untroubled, went on fishing and the pupils chopping wood. On 15 March 1990 one of the 12 fragmentation bombs dropped on Likuwa (four at 0845 hours and eight at 1600 hours) seriously wounded a farmer who was convinced that the bombs only hit soldiers and had, therefore, continued to cut the grass. He fell 500 meters as the crow flies from the foxholes where my friend and I had dug ourselves in. Another bomb buried itself in the ground by the side of the trail less than a kilometer from the same foxholes without exploding.

And this is the tragedy: Preceded or accompanied and guided by Swiss-made PC-7 or PC-9 observation planes that fly at a very high altitude, the MiG-23, MiG-27, or SU-25 bombers drop their bombs at random from 8,000 or 10,000 meters and only risk killing civilians. At that altitude, in fact, the American Stinger ground-to-air or Soviet SAM-7 missiles or even the 23-mm guns cannot destroy them. But they themselves [the planes] do not reach true military objectives because they fly very high and too fast and the bombs are lost in the bush or the corn or sorghum fields. Which led Jonas Savimbi to say: "If only they would fly a bit lower, that would be very good for us!" With an even more acid sense of humor, Colonel Jorge Valentin, the head of the UNITA delegation in the (suspended) negotiations with Luanda leaders, quipped: "Let them drop to 1,500 meters to bomb us. That way, we'll be able to 'negotiate' directly, without intermediaries." Paradoxically, MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] bombers do not operate in the combat zones, on the Mavinga fronts northwest of Jamba and Yonde, well to the west. There, only the booming of mortars, whose shells have

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

33

destroyed the hospital in Mavinga and continue to wreak havoc among the UNITA ranks, is heard.

**Penetrated Defenses**

Luanda leaders have committed 15,000 men to the Yonde front and 12,000 to the Mavinga front. Yonde has held the line well, but the first two lines of defense at Mavinga have been penetrated by the MPLA's 400 tanks.

Brilliant and obviously very competent, Gen Huambo, 32, the chief of military intelligence, admitted in rather American English: "The beast that is causing us so much trouble is called the BMP-1." This is an amphibious armored vehicle that combines the characteristics of a troop transport and an assault tank. Twelve men can be crammed into it, including the driver and the 76-mm gun crew, as well as antitank missile and antipersonnel rocket launchers.

I saw an intact specimen of this "beast," 200 of which UNITA claims to have destroyed or captured. Despite its 12.5 tons and 19 cm of armor on its sides and 23 cm on the turret, the BMP-1 is actually very maneuverable—it turns on itself in 30 seconds—and above all very fast: I test drove it at over 100 km an hour. It adapts to any terrain and it is the BMP-1 that has enabled MPLA forces to pierce UNITA defense lines, particularly when crossing the Lomba River.

Government forces' attacks are made in a frontal assault manner in application of Soviet or Israeli tactics: Dozens of BMP-1's are lined up on the slopes and the artillery and infantry advance in two groups, each at a distance of 500 meters from the supply column. It was in this way that the columns, starting out from their base in Cuito Cuanavale, were able to royally supply the forces that had taken Dinde and pierced the first lines of defense at Mavinga with ammunition, food rations, and equipment. The formidable BMP-1's cut into them like butter and the UNITA forces had to withdraw. As of 18 March 1990 they had officially lost 240 men and listed 863 as wounded since 5 January.

But the war took a new turn at the end of January. At that time Jonas Savimbi interrupted his official visit to Portugal to go directly to the front. Indubitably charismatic, this 55-year-old man—shorter than he appears in photos of him—galvanized everyone right down to the Lambda soldier who did not see him, but just suspected his presence on the front. So, the UNITA counterattack began in early February. Swift, effective, and very deadly.

The MPLA columns were literally "cut to pieces" by the guerrilla operations of UNITA whose tactics were the following: A group of from 10 to 20 fighters serve as bait to lure the MPLA BMP-1's into the most heavily wooded areas of the bush where 30 to 50 Landrovers or Toyotas lie

waiting in ambush. The BMP-1's cannot actually be attacked head on. They are invulnerable to RPG-7 rockets.

**Army Corps Decimated**

But their fuel tanks, which are attached to the two rear hatches, render them vulnerable. So, they have to be gotten around or encircled and then destroyed with rockets. This is what happened at Dinde where the Second MPLA Army Corps, commanded by Col Joao De Mateus, was decimated. This is what happened when two MPLA columns were "cut to pieces." They had left Cuito Cuanavale, one of them on 1 March and the other on 10 March, to supply the forces engaged in action at Dinde and surrounding Mavinga. They never reached their destination. The First MPLA Army Corps, 10 km northwest of Mavinga, and the Sixth Tactical Group, 15 km south of there, were no longer supplied. Cut off from their rear base, they were no longer receiving ammunition, food, or fuel. Thirsty, hungry, the soldiers abandoned their BMP-1's, intact, to go and beg or steal still-green corn from the villagers before surrendering to UNITA. UNITA claims to have killed 1,534 enemy soldiers, wounded 2,864 others, and destroyed or captured 200 of the 400 tanks operating on the Mavinga front alone between 5 January and 18 March 1990. These figures may be exaggerated, but how can we fail to be impressed by the almost religious way in which UNITA officers note: "I'm a soldier," handsome and brilliant Gen Andolosio Mango, the UNITA representative in Bonn, said to me, "I cannot lie to myself. These figures are certain." Col Ribeiro Lohoca, the director of logistics in Likuwa—and therefore responsible for the rear base of the Mavinga front—did not dispute the statement: "We organize the quartermaster corps in terms of our needs at the front. I only know what they are from war reports since I'm not on the battlefield. How and why do you suppose anyone would try to fool me?"

I was able to talk to 9 of the 120 MPLA prisoners whom UNITA claims to have captured since the start of the current battles. They were young—from 18 to 28 years old—and they confirmed the fact that their comrades no longer had anything to eat or drink in this semiarid region of Southeastern Angola. Savimbi himself has regained his optimism: "Give me 1 month more and this war will be over. The MPLA made the mistake of launching the 21 December offensive. You can't sustain and succeed in an offensive for 3 months. They failed." Then why did the MPLA embark on this adventure? Gen Huambo, the UNITA military intelligence chief, was categorical: "It's because the MPLA trusts the Soviets, who say one thing and do another: Gorbachev devotes himself to his perestroika, but the Red Army is bent on consolidating its positions in Africa after having lost the war in Afghanistan."

I asked Gen Huambo for proof of this Soviet presence on the battlefield. He gave me a photocopy of a letter written in Russian by his wife and found in a leather suitcase near a body that had been burned to a cinder. It was skimpy evidence.

As for Savimbi, he proved to be more political. "The MPLA chairman, Dos Santos," he said to me, "wants to negotiate from a strong position and so he tried to weaken us militarily first. But he failed. We resisted his offensive and his army is demoralized, defeated."

Thus, Savimbi seems to be more certain than ever that he can negotiate from a comfortable position. While I was in the area controlled by his troops, he disappeared for 4 days. On his return and at the time of our second meeting, he confided to me: "I've just met with the Cubans. They assured me that they had advised the MPLA not to launch this offensive. Now the MPLA has lost it."

Nothing is less certain than this. There will be neither winners nor losers in this civil war that has lasted for 15 years. The UNITA leaders, who say that they are relying on Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko's mediation, know this. They admit that there have been misunderstandings—Savimbi had publicly accused Mobutu of partiality, even of lying—but they stated: "We had a mediation problem, but not a mediator problem. Mobutu was proposed as a mediator by Dos Santos; we've never challenged that, we agree to it."

Savimbi is convinced that peace is near. Passing through Luanda in mid-March, Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Edouard Shevardnadze said the same thing: "It is not impossible that peace will be restored to Angola between now and June."

## Madagascar

### \* IDA Grants Loan To Develop Private Sector

90AF0098A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET  
MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Apr 90 p 1037  
—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] The private sector will play a more important role in the Malagasy economy as a result of a project aimed at reforming the country's financial sector and providing loans to candidates who will create enterprises. The IDA [International Development Association] supports this project through a credit of 36.4 million SDR [Special Drawing Rights] (\$48 million).

Funds corresponding to the IDA credit will be deposited in financial institutions of Madagascar. They will then make the funds available to private investors needing capital to create, enlarge, or reorganize enterprises in all sectors of the economy.

The project envisages operations in the field of training, information services, and technical assistance to existing and newly created enterprises, as well as financial institutions, to help them streamline their operations, increase their profitability, and adopt a more commercial orientation. The Central Bank will receive technical assistance to help it strengthen its planning capacity and implement monetary policies.

Further measures will consist of restructuring the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Madagascar and establishing an organization for investment and promotion.

This project, which will improve the investment climate in Madagascar and support reforms in the financial sector, plays an important role in the general effort for the country's economic adjustment.

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

WEST AFRICA

35

## Guinea

### \* CMRN Promotes Conte to Major General

90P40029A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET  
MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Apr 90 p 1084  
—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] The Military Committee for National Redress [CMRN] promoted Guinean President Lansana Conte to the rank of major general. The Guinean head of state, who was a colonel when he came to power in April 1984, was made brigadier general in 1985 on the basis of "exceptional merit."

In addition, the CMRN promoted to colonel Lieutenant Colonels Sory Doumboya, resident minister of Middle Guinea; Karifa Kourouma, ambassador to Libya; and Fenando Tiany, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. Finally, Captain Abdourahamane Diallo, a member of President Conte's inner circle, was promoted to major.

### \* Conakry Sets Priorities for French Aid

90AF0045A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET  
MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Mar 90 pp 820-821  
—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] France will concentrate the bulk of its aid to Guinea on teacher training, agricultural development, and infrastructures—areas identified by the Guinean Government as the major priorities for the period 1990-92.

The work of this commission—which was carried out on 12 and 13 March with the participation of French Minister of Cooperation and Development Jacques Pelletier—also afforded an opportunity to invite private investors to invest in Guinea, which offers great opportunities in connection with its economic and social development and has just instituted a new fiscal and legal system.

The French minister of cooperation and development stated on 13 March—at the conclusion of an audience with the Guinean chief of state, General Lansana Conte—that in talking with the latter he had made reference primarily to the commitment undertaken by Guinea to construct a government of laws. Pelletier added that democracy cannot be decreed and that every citizen should be involved in the construction of a government of laws.

### Private Sector Conference

A conference incidental to the third Franco-Guinean joint commission was held between representatives of the the French and Guinean private sectors. The Guinean delegation was headed by Dr Saibou Nabe, president of the Guinean Employers Association (PG); Yamoussa Bangoura, vice president; Dr Abdoulaye Bangoura, secretary general; and Mme Fatoumata Diallo, member of the executive board. The French delegation was headed by Jean-Pierre Ranchon, delegate general of the CIAN [Committee of French Investors in

Black Africa]; Gerard Egnell, CIAN administrator in charge of the PME/PMI [small and medium-size businesses/small and medium-size industries] sector; Mr Deboeuf, foreign trade adviser; and Mme Martine Hamalde, PDG [president and general manager] of Tecotex.

The representatives of the Guinean Employers Association—who prepared an interesting report that was transmitted on 15 February to the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of the Republic of Guinea—spoke on this occasion in the name of the Guinean private sector. The representatives of the CIAN and CNPF [National Council of French Employers] expressed the hope that Guinean private businessmen can organize themselves into a confederation or national council, in accordance with the wishes of the Guinean Employers Association.

The principal problems facing private companies in Guinea were discussed very extensively, and many of these problems were brought up again in the comments made by the Guinean employers. They are as follows:

1. The legal and social system—which has been substantially improved in recent years—should continue to receive the undivided attention of Guinean government officials.
2. The French delegation hopes for an improvement of the cooperation between the government and the private sector.
3. There should be respect for the commitments made both by the government and by the heads of businesses within the framework of the agreements that have been signed.
4. The French private sector supports the Guinean Government in the action that it has already undertaken to deal with the "parallel market," which is detrimental to the national budget and to the enterprises in the modern sector of the economy. It believes an effort at reconversion could also be made, and that one must necessarily support the action of the government with respect to improvement of the infrastructure.
5. Greater flexibility in the granting of access to credit for Guinean and foreign enterprises alike is to be desired. In this connection, the action of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) is particularly beneficial, and the French private sector has great confidence in the new plan that will be implemented in a few months.
6. The French private sector also believes it would be advisable for the private sector to be consulted in connection with the granting of new credits.
7. It also recommends that an Arbitration Commission be empowered to examine any lawsuits that arise between a private company and a state enterprise. This would obviate recourse to the courts, inasmuch as the

Commission would consist of an equal number of representatives of the two governments and of the two private sectors.

The two delegations of the private sector were pleased with the results of the conference, and expressed the hope of meeting again within the next few months either in Conakry or in Paris, possibly as part of a Guinean-French meeting organized either by the Guinean Employers Association or by the CIAN.

## Nigeria

### Security Agents Intensify Coup Plotters Search

AB1305103090 Lagos NAN in English 0930 GMT  
13 May 90—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Warri [words indistinct]—As the search for the April 22 abortive coup plotters continues security agents in the oil city of Warri have intensified efforts in that direction, extending it to nooks and crannies of the local government area and beyond.

Places that have received a [word indistinct] share of the intensive search are the hotels a NEWS AGENCY OF NIGERIA reports that in the early hours of Thursday a lorry load of policemen swooped on Hotel Peggy along (?Airport) Road in search of the dissidents. [sentence as received] They had carried out similar operations [words indistinct] Grove Hotels (?Enorpen) Motel among others. So far no arrests have been made.

However before the operation among the hotels the police had earlier held a meeting with hotel operators in the oil city to submit the names of their resident guests.

A company, (?Tomab) Nig Ltd along Warri Sapele Road which is being rumoured that the much sought for Chief Ogboru [passage indistinct] by Chief Ogboru in Warri were sealed after the putsch.

### \* Success of Imposed Two Party System Doubted

34000601A London NEW AFRICAN in English  
Apr 90 p 22—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By Uchendu Egbezor; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The attempt by the Babangida government to artificially impose two parties in Nigeria does not ensure the proper representation of class or ideological interests. It denies the free formation of parties by those prepared to take up the challenge, argues Uchendu Egbezor.

The ongoing exercise by the AFRC [Armed Forces Ruling Council] to impose two parties on Nigeria is bad. First it seeks to impose a false unanimity on Nigeria. Secondly, but most importantly, it does not provide a wide enough forum to debate and analyse what, in my opinion, is the root cause of political instability and bad economic management in Nigeria. This is the struggle

for private accumulation of capital by Nigeria's political elites. A cursory look back into Nigeria's history shows this abundantly.

In 1961 Dr Chike Obi wrote: "The common man in Nigeria can today no longer be fooled by sweet talk at election time only to be exploited and treated like dirt after the booty of office has been shared among the politicians."

Unconcerned with such well founded alarms the Nigerian petit bourgeoisie, who became the core of the political elite, went about consolidating their hold on their respective regional enclaves. Apart from the new position and rewards which were not within their reach, they also stoked up tribal hatred to buttress and improve their power in the centre.

It is a historical fact that prior to colonialism the tribes that made up Nigeria interacted with each other harmoniously, in a relative sense. Tribal self-awareness was not an issue of much significance. With the transition to formal independence, the manoeuvring of the Nigerian petit bourgeoisie to consolidate their economic power intensified. It became part of their *modus operandi* not only to stoke up tribal animosity but also to deepen these hostile feelings.

The fall of the first republic was the consequence of this malaise.

During the second republic, it did not take long for the euphoria of the new constitution to fade as the governments that followed sunk into the quagmire of corruption. The flagrant display of wealth of the political elites and their hangers on contrasted vividly with deepening impoverishment of the masses. At the extreme was the now defunct National Party of Nigeria, held together by the links of financial patronage or "You chop and I chop" relationship.

In times of plenty such a system may just about survive but faced with diminishing resources and less pay-off capacity, its collapse became a foregone conclusion.

The party system collapsed because of the frenzied manner with which Nigeria's budding bourgeois class liquidated the national treasury. A slight push by the army was enough to end the second republic but not the structures that create and sustain the system.

It is quite clear that the fundamental problem of Nigeria's politics is rooted in its ethical foundations. In other words, the problem is not so much the names of or numbers of parties, but the motives and attitudes of those who seek political power.

It is against this background that the latest mechanical imposition of two parties on Nigeria is retrogressive. Political parties are organisations which fill the function of interest aggregation. Parties then reflect the configuration of the contending classes and their alliances.

FBIS-~~AFR~~-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## WEST AFRICA

37

Thus the predominance of two parties in some of the mature liberal democracies such as the U.S. and the UK reflects the degree of consensus with the status-quo. Such parties are in many cases the result of a dialectical process within the society. In the UK the once strong Liberal party has faded out of the political scene while its place has been taken by Labour. Presently we see the process playing itself out in Eastern Europe as the old bureaucratic communist parties crumble under the popular onslaught of the masses of these nations.

In the context of Nigeria, what is needed is a wide-ranging debate about what to do with its disarticulated economy, its very low industrial base, its corrupt and greedy political elites and above all the iniquitous distribution of wealth in the country.

A free-for-all process for the formation of parties and an extensive contest of ideas is imperative. It is the synthesis of such ideas and the response which it generates from the masses which will ensure growth and durability.

Across Nigeria's political scene, many political trends can be gauged. For example within the capitalist camp, there are those who follow more nationalist trends who would like to see Nigeria with an independent industrial base competing with other capitalist nations. There are others who are content to lodge themselves on the body of foreign multi-nationals like the parasites which they are. Similarly, within the socialist camp, there are those who favour a creative application of Marxist solutions to Nigeria's problems and others who trot out Marxist cliches for the sake of it.

To force such trends into two agglomerations under the artificially created political parties is a recipe for more chaos and disaster.

It took a bloody civil war for Nigeria's political elites to talk in terms of accommodation with each other. I hope it does not take a bloody class war for these same elites to realise that the Nigerian masses are not their plaything.

#### \* Shelling Outlines NPA's Future Objectives

34000642 London WEST AFRICA in English  
30 Apr-6 May 90 pp 724-725—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Interview with Major-General Abdullah Shelling, Managing Director of Nigerian Port Authority]

[Text] What measures do you expect the Technical Commission for Privatization and Commercialization [TCPC] to recommend for the restructuring of NPA [Nigerian Ports Authority]?

For 35 years, NPA has had responsibility for cargo handling at the quays, both housing and acting as bailee for goods in its custody. It is responsible for pilotage and towage, dredging and marking navigable channels and lighthousing.

Ports all over the developing world face rapidly changing technologies in ship design and cargo packaging, and so are sometimes forced to hire contractors on a temporary basis.

The objectives of a fully commercialized Nigerian Ports Authority should be as follows: to make provision and operation of port facilities in Nigeria its dominant business function; to expand into new areas of activity or areas related to the skills, knowledge and competence of its workforce; to manage the workforce more efficiently and accelerate retraining while capitalizing further on management skills acquired over the years; to be more customer oriented by opening up and streamlining its management structure; to conduct all its operations efficiently, competitively and profitably; to offer neighboring landlocked countries unimpeded access to the sea for their international trade; generate offshore revenue and maintain a creditworthiness so as to remain attractive to national and international investors. The Authority is currently organized into a number of directorates. It is expected that the TCPC will build on and streamline this structure.

What is the composition of the present labor force?

Of a total labor force of 16,912, there are 2,128 senior staff (level eight and above) and 14,784 junior staff (level one to seven). They are distributed as follows: Headquarters: 3,320; Lagos Port Complex: 5,599; Tin Can Island Port: 2,183; Rivers Port: 2,474; Calabar Port: 837; Federal Ocean Terminal (Onne): 267; Container Terminal (Ijora): 650. The total wage bill for both officers and staff averages N10m per month, or N120m per annum.

How will the NPA of the year 2000 differ from that of 1990?

Nigerian ports are poorly located. All of them are located on rivers, deltas and lagoons behind offshore bars—and can only be kept open by periodic dredging. When compared with Matadi on the Congo or Freetown's Pointe Noire with their natural depth of water, the Nigerian ports are in a very poor position for handling the second generation of container vessels, 2500 TEU, which are now in operation, and the third generation of container vessels, 4500 TEU. The situation is more or less the same for very large oil tankers and large bulk cargo carriers. It is hoped that within the decade 1990-2000, serious consideration will be given to building a deep ocean industrial port to accommodate vessels drawing 45-80 meter drafts. This is essential if Nigeria is to realize fully the benefits of international trade. Such a complex would act as a consolidation center for cargos destined for the less developed ports of the sub-region.

Nigerian ports can be classified as those constructed during or before the 1970s. In the first category are Apapa Quays, Port Harcourt Quays and the old Port of Warri. In the second category are Tin Can, 3rd Wharf, Container Terminal Apapa, Calabar and Warri. The older ports were built to accommodate smaller sized

vessels and therefore have a shallow draft of 7-9m depth, whereas the modern ports have a draft of 11 meters and above, accommodating higher, more modern vessels.

In all this, finance is a major constraint. Available funds will be used to replace old and obsolete plant and equipment; to build and modernize old ports; to acquire time saving plant and equipment for quick turnaround of ships; to re-roof and rewrite sheds and warehouses; to dismantle obsolete structures and create bigger and more modern stacking areas for container boxes; to demolish existing wharves and create deeper ones where necessary; to deepen approach channels to accommodate bigger ships; to provide modern navigational aids and modernize lighthouses; to upgrade existing analogue telephone systems to digital network systems, to make them more efficient and capable of carrying modern data (fax, computer data) along telephone lines. All in-house telephone systems in all the ports need to be linked by an in-house radio communication system in such a manner that telex, telephone, fax and computer data can be exchanged instantly between ports at the touch of a button. This in-house system should be independent of the public network so as to ensure the installation of a reliable management information system, such as is found in all modern ports. On the international maritime, mobile telecommunication scene, at least three port stations—one for each zone of the authority—need to be installed for exchange of telex, fax and telephone with ships afloat all over the world. These are also revenueyielding.

Modern electronic surveillance systems need to be installed in all ports to check piracy and pilfering, lighting system for the security of goods and cargoes need to be provided and the old obsolete power distribution network should be replaced with stable power supply.

What specific initiatives are possible or underway, and how will they improve shipping and port industries in West Africa?

What benefits do we derive from cooperation of ports in the West African sub-region? In 1972, the United Nations Economic Commission of Africa [ECA] created the Port management Association of West and Central Africa, which is a sub-regional grouping comprising 17 regular and eight associate members from Mauritania right down to Angola. This association initiates projects like dredging of some member ports, or aids to navigation, analytical accounting and uniform tariff structure.

Overseas donor countries and agencies are rather skeptical about giving funding directly to the government. They prefer giving the funding to sub-regional groupings such as the Association of Ports of West and Central Africa, where they believe that the money given will be used for the specific purpose for which the aid is given.

There is a publication being prepared by the Port Management Association of West and Central Africa (headquartered in Lagos) with aid from the ECA, to publish a guide of port experts in the sub-region. This is in order to

prevent the not so-developed ports going to Europe or elsewhere but rather getting their experts from the member countries. Also, there are the more developed ports of the sub-region with more equipment than they can use. The less developed ports can lease equipment from their counterparts so it is not necessary for such ports to acquire their own equipment, which is very expensive to purchase.

Training programs are arranged for personnel from less developed ports, to save foreign exchange on training abroad. Also, there is a study soon to be undertaken linking half a dozen ports of the sub-region by computer, so that if you are in Lagos you can know the shipping position in Abidjan or Pointe Noire, Congo. There is a request for funding to build silos in some of the port zones in the sub-region.

The Union of African Shippers Council (UASC) and the African National Shipping Lines (ANSL), are sub-regional groupings which coordinate activities in their respective domains.

Of course, if all the countries in Europe did not think that they had something to derive by coming together they would not be talking of the big European market of 1992.

So, it is in our own best interest that we come together, to have at least a single voice when talking about port development or shipping in the sub-region.

#### \* 'Shuttle Diplomacy' Said To Yield Results

34000613B London AFRICAN BUSINESS in English  
Apr 90 pp 37-39—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Jato Thompson: "Shuttle Diplomacy Brings Home The Bacon"]

[Text] One of Nigeria's best hopes is the economic diplomacy energetically pursued by former External Affairs Minister Major-General Ike Nwachukwu.

The new focus uses the medium of foreign relations to boost economic development, enhance the performance of the industrial sector and attract foreign investment. As Nwachukwu once told new heads of missions, "Our policy with our trading partners and friends needs a new orientation."

In a sense, the economic diplomacy is a logical follow-up to the changes sweeping through the economy generally. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) has continued to tackle the issue of deregulation of interest rates, has given birth to the foreign-exchange market which liberalised the value of the naira and has embarked on the privatisation and commercialisation of badly run and money-guzzling public companies.

In addition, a debt-for-equity programme was introduced. All these measures are aimed principally at foreign investors, but, without a plausible follow-up policy, they would not have yielded results.

FBIS-APR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## WEST AFRICA

39

Under the policy, the former Minister undertook numerous efforts at shuttle diplomacy, with the sole purpose of discussing bilateral economic issues with his hosts. Such trips have taken him to Brazil, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, India, South Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, Singapore, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark.

He held talks with industrialists and government officials and came home with numerous pledges by the industrialists to invest in agriculture, coal mining, food processing, fishing, food distribution, the processing of raw materials for export, shipping, irrigation, battery manufacture, road construction, petrochemicals, rail development, primary manufacture, dairy projects and livestock development. They also pledged to put up 50 percent of the funds for the businesses, while the Lagos government assured them of a liberal lending policy in Nigeria.

He went on further shuttles to Britain, West Germany, several East European states and several African states to explore opportunities for economic and technical co-operation. All the while, the Minister worked closely with the organised private sector. Indeed, he made a point of including captains of industry in all his shuttles.

The result of this shuttle diplomacy is evident in the UK's \$100m pledge of "exceptional assistance". A soft loan of \$200m was also granted by the Japanese government in support of the Federal government's economic policies. In fact, in one such diplomatic foray, the External Affairs Minister came away with an outright grant of \$23m from the Japanese government. He also got the Japanese interested in investing in Nigeria's petrochemicals, liquefied natural gas and oil-condensate projects.

The South Koreans have signed a N720m (\$92m) investment agreement with Nigeria and have pledged \$10m as an economic development co-operation fund to be spent in buying railway rolling stock.

Beside these examples, the shuttle served as an additional impetus to talks on debt rescheduling, which culminated in the reaching of agreements between Nigeria and the London and Paris Clubs.

While this was going on, the government introduced the debt-equity swap. The programme is intended to achieve a major reduction of Nigeria's \$34bn in foreign debt. Last November, \$31 was chipped off the huge debt, bringing the total figure of debt so far swapped to \$265.7m (see also the article on Investment Opportunity in this survey).

A special feature of the last auction for 1989 was that the converted debt included for the first time debt owed to commercial banks, totalling about \$1.2m. Until then, the conversion has been limited to promissory notes. Conglomerates were buying the promissory notes from their

original holders as a result of the high rate of credit in the banking sector and subsequently were redeeming the notes.

Over 70 percent of the amount realised from the debt-equity swap so far has been invested in 30 projects in agriculture, manufacturing, building and construction.

As part of the government's bid to curb inflation, some of the redeemed amount has been lodged in a special account from which releases are made to redeemers periodically, based on the level of completion of their projects. This year, the Central Bank of Nigeria has received 136 applications from foreign creditors seeking to convert up to \$2.07bn.

### Expanding Its Reach

One feature of the economic diplomacy is that, while not turning away from its traditional trading partners, Nigeria is expanding its reach. Trade with its traditional foremost partner, the UK, has been on the decline for some years now, and Britain's position as Nigeria's leading trading partner has been overtaken by the U. S. and European countries, especially West Germany and France. "The sad truth is that trade relations between Nigeria and Britain, one the dominant feature of the Nigerian economy, have over time declined," concedes Oladele Olosore, one of Nigeria's foremost bankers. The surprising thing, he points out, is that the decline is happening at a time when obstacles militating against foreign investment in Nigeria, such as problems of repatriation of dividends and policy instability, have been removed.

One country that has benefited a great deal from the new investment trend in Nigeria is France. And to consolidate its position, France recently set up a Nigeria Fund, in which \$200m worth of aid is expected to come from donors around Europe. President Babangida in March became the first Nigerian head of state ever to pay an official visit to France (see box).

While all this is happening the government is knocking together new policies expected to incorporate countertrade, which was abandoned at official level at the inception of the SAP, because of its many flaws. One important proponent of countertrade, J. K. Randle, forecasts in a paper presented last year that in the period 1992-95 the Nigerian government will discover that countertrade has become inevitable, both to reinforce the SAP and to serve as its alternative in many respects. "The least we can do is to ensure that we possess and develop countertrade capability and managerial skills, combined with knowledgeable monitoring expertise, in order to reassure ourselves that in the event of a crunch, we shall not be caught, once again, with our trousers down," he observes. "Countertrade could provide the safety belt, but it is up to us to gird our loins." Undoubtedly, it will bring additional push to the high-flying economic diplomacy.

Before he was dropped as External Affairs Minister, last December, Nwachukwu had expressed the opinion that economic diplomacy focuses on building the foundations for positive bilateral economic co-operation between Nigeria and many friendly nations.

The new man at the External Affairs Ministry, Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman—no stranger to the international stage at either the diplomatic or the economic level, as former Chairman of Opec—has already pledged to continue with economic diplomacy. In the months ahead, it is expected that he will bring home more results and will help enlarge the map of Nigeria's trading partners.

#### \* Retaliation Against Harassment Abroad Endorsed

34000628B London WEST AFRICA in English  
23-29 Apr 90 p 681—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Editorial: "Harassment of Nigerians Abroad"]

[Text] For some time now, Nigerians travelling abroad have been subjected to varying degrees of harassment and molestation. At international ports of entry, travelling Nigerians are now involved in international criminal activities, including drug trafficking, smuggling and visa racketeering. Indeed, hardly a week goes by without one sensational report detailing how yet another Nigerian has been arrested for one of these offences in a distant part of the globe. The extra vigilance on the part of customs, immigration and police officers when dealing with Nigerians is therefore seen as a direct and expected consequence of the sordid record of Nigerians abroad.

It is all too easy to be taken in by the easy logic of such an argument. The apparent frequency and the increasing number of such arrests cannot conceal the fact that disreputable Nigerians yet constitute a very small minority of the sum total of all travelling Nigerians. A large number of our citizens are involved in an astonishing variety of noble international activity, including diplomacy, business, study and tourism, and they should not be routinely humiliated and harassed in the purported pursuit of a tiny minority.

It has become rather difficult not to now agree with those who have long maintained that such intimidation is informed largely by thinly veiled racism. Many countries harbour even greater numbers of international hooligans and criminals, yet their citizens are treated with the standards of human decency. The truth is that any African who appears affluent and capable of travelling frequently is immediately assumed to be living off criminal proceeds, and is therefore subjected to brutal investigation.

Clearly, the time has come for such routine brutalisation to be ended. In the first place, there is the need to further tighten security arrangements at all our international ports. More stringent security and control measures at home would greatly reduce the number of criminal Nigerians travelling abroad, and ensure that only those

with genuine international commitments unlikely to embarrass the country actually to go out.

Secondly, the Federal Government must protest most vehemently against any country which metes out cruel and unusual harassment to travelling Nigerians. And if this does not lead to a substantial reduction in the frequency and magnitude of this harassment, then the internationally accepted principle of reciprocity must be brought to bear in our treatment of visitors from other countries.

#### \* Government Policies To Lure Investors Viewed

34000613A London AFRICAN BUSINESS in English  
Apr 90 pp 32-33—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Pini Jason: "Looser Economic Rein Could Lure Firms Back"]

[Text] The deregulation of Nigeria's economy, which is aimed in part at diversifying it away from its dependency on oil, has opened up several avenues for foreign investors.

When President Babangida launched Nigeria's new industrial policy in January 1989, the main objective was to accelerate the pace of industrial development by encouraging increased private-sector participation in the industrial sector and by privatising and commercialising holdings in certain existing industrial enterprises.

The government was to confine itself more to a catalytic role in the establishment of new industries, by providing and improving infrastructural facilities and by making the regulatory environment more amenable.

In a vigorous pursuit of the government's divestment from certain businesses, the Technical Committee on Privatisation & Commercialisation (TCPC) has so far made government shares in 13 insurance companies available for sale. Some shares in the National Oil & Chemical Marketing Company, in African Petroleum and in Flour Mills of Nigeria have already been sold. According to President Babangida, the total government investment in the companies sold is N7.58bn (now \$968m). On this outlay, the government has made a total gain of N123,730.

#### Debt-Equity Conversion

Although privatisation and commercialisation offer indigenous investors new avenues of investment, the debt-equity conversion, on the other hand, offers foreign redeemers the opportunity to invest in selected areas like construction, agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. So far, Nigeria's external creditors have submitted 136 applications to convert debts totalling \$2.07bn into equities in Nigerian companies. In the 11 auctions so far conducted as of January this year, \$305.5m in debts had been auctioned, and the redeeming parties had offered \$143.29m, while \$162.21m was converted to equities in Nigerian companies.

FBIS-AFR-90-097-S  
18 May 1990

## WEST AFRICA

41

Of the 136 applications, approval has been given to 98 to convert \$992.14m worth of debts. A sectoral breakdown of applications received shows that the agricultural sector topped the list. Of 41 applications to convert \$1.22bn into equities, 29 applications were approved which converted \$236.18m into equities in the agricultural sector.

Another \$344.73m, for 54 applications, were approved for the manufacturing sector, while four applications worth \$181.73m were approved for investments in the hotel and tourism sector. Two applications to convert \$10.62m to equities in the exploration and mining sector were approved, while another two applications worth \$27.10m were approved for the building and construction industry.

**Oil and Gas**

Nigeria's petroleum and gas industry still offers the best investment opportunity. In June last year, British Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs Lynda Chalker led a delegation of 40 British oilmen to Nigeria. The delegation was exposed to the investment opportunities in the concerted and accelerated exploration and development of Nigeria's crude oil and gas reserves, as well as in the petrochemicals production sector. While proven reserves of crude oil have been put at 16bn barrels, gas reserves have been estimated to be equivalent to 23bn barrels of crude oil.

Nigeria, therefore, still needs increased participation in direct oil exploration, production and processing. There are limitless private investment opportunities in both upstream and downstream areas, including refining. Investors could build medium-sized refineries to process crude for export, or they could set up maintenance outfits for existing refineries.

The establishment of the Warri and Kaduna petrochemicals plants and the proposed one at Port Harcourt have opened up numerous downstream investment opportunities for potential investors. These plants produce the raw materials for the production of plastics, packaging materials, soaps & detergents, synthetic fibres, paints and pharmaceuticals.

With the Federal government's determination that Nigeria is to be self-sufficient in food and raw materials, agriculture is another area which offers investment opportunities. Over N208m was allocated to agriculture in the 1990 budget. According to Chief Oladele Olashore, the Chairman of Lead Merchant Bank, some of the investment opportunities are in the area of agricultural processing and the supply and service of tractors for specialised agricultural development schemes such as the wheat programme. Other areas of investment are silo construction ventures, which will be necessary to help prevent the increased danger of wastage that could accompany a higher level of food production.

**Banking**

Nigeria's banking sector has experienced a phenomenal growth in recent years, from 45 banks in 1985 to 89 banks

in 1989. With tight monetary measures over the past few years, there has been a diversification of investments in the banking sector to areas like equipment leasing. In the 1989 policy, 15 percent of merchant banks' total permissible credit is allowed to go for equipment leasing. Banks are also allowed to hold equity in companies.

**Industry**

The Federal government is relentless in its efforts at industrialisation. Attracting great attention is the strategy of industrialisation through small- and medium-scale industries. In 1989, therefore, the government established the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (Nerfund) and the World Bank-assisted Small & Medium Enterprises (SME) Loan Scheme to provide long-term finance for small- and medium-scale industrial and agro-allied enterprises and ancillary services.

The loans can be in naira or in foreign currencies or both, according to the source of the funds available and the requirement of the eligible enterprises. They are disbursed through 73 participating banks. The initial capital of both funds has been provided by the Federal government (N200m), the Central Bank of Nigeria (N100m), the World Bank and its IDA [International Development Association] (\$270m) and the Czechoslovakian government (\$50m). These sums together more than adequately cover the two funds' total requirement of N4.4bn.

The investment outlook for Nigeria in the 1990s looks brighter than it has for some time, especially if the world oil market becomes more stable, if Nigeria is successful in winning debt reschedulings and if the country can diversify the productive base of the economy.

The other sources of optimism include the vigorous pursuit of the privatisation and commercialisation of government businesses, the local sourcing of raw materials and a determined pursuit of non-oil exports.

It is strongly believed in Lagos that the savings investment gap of about N28bn in Nigeria's three-year rolling plan will be a incentive to investment. Moreover, with a largely untapped market of more than 110m potential consumers, Nigeria still offers a rather large carrot to potential investors.

**Senegal****Extradition Treaty With U.S. Signing Envisaged**

AB1005181090 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French  
7 May 90 p 14—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] The Senegalese Government plans to sign with the United States an extradition treaty in order to complete cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, which is clearly on an upward trend between the two countries. Two Senegalese officers are currently in the United States while four others are participating, in Abidjan, in the special training program drawn up by American experts for West Africa.

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

6 June 1990

